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ANONYMIZATION AND RISK 
Ira S. Rubinstein
*
 & Woodrow Hartzog
**
 
Abstract: Perfect anonymization of data sets that contain personal information has failed. 
But the process of protecting data subjects in shared information remains integral to privacy 
practice and policy. While the deidentification debate has been vigorous and productive, 
there is no clear direction for policy. As a result, the law has been slow to adapt a holistic 
approach to protecting data subjects when data sets are released to others. Currently, the law 
is focused on whether an individual can be identified within a given set. We argue that the 
best way to move data release policy past the alleged failures of anonymization is to focus on 
the process of minimizing risk of reidentification and sensitive attribute disclosure, not 
preventing harm. Process-based data release policy, which resembles the law of data security, 
will help us move past the limitations of focusing on whether data sets have been 
“anonymized.” It draws upon different tactics to protect the privacy of data subjects, 
including accurate deidentification rhetoric, contracts prohibiting reidentification and 
sensitive attribute disclosure, data enclaves, and query-based strategies to match required 
protections with the level of risk. By focusing on process, data release policy can better 
balance privacy and utility where nearly all data exchanges carry some risk. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For years, it was widely believed that as long as data sets were 
“anonymized,” they posed no risk to anyone’s privacy. If data sets were 
anonymized, then they did not reveal the identity of individuals 
connected to the data. Unfortunately, the notion of perfect 
anonymization has been exposed as a myth. Over the past twenty years, 
researchers have shown that individuals can be identified in many 
different data sets once thought to have been “anonymized.”1 For 
example, in 2006, America Online (AOL) famously published a sample 
of its search queries. Although AOL replaced screen names with random 
numbers in the published search logs, this minimal step did not suffice to 
protect its users, and within days the New York Times discovered and 
revealed the identity of a 62-year-old AOL customer in the data set, 
Thelma Arnold.
2
 Similar high-profile anonymization failures were 
                                                     
1. See infra Part I. 
2. See Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/DHF9-8YEV]. For a full account of the AOL reidentification, see Paul Ohm, 
Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 1701, 1717–18 (2010) (noting that AOL released twenty million search queries for 650,000 
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attributed to data sets released by Netflix
3




The possibility of correctly identifying people and attributes from 
anonymized data sets has sparked one of the most lively and important 
debates in privacy law. The credibility of anonymization, which anchors 
much of privacy law, is now open to attack. How should the law 
respond? 
The failure of anonymization has identified a weakness in the focus of 
the law surrounding data releases. Some critics argue that it is 
impossible to eliminate privacy harms from publicly released data using 
anonymization techniques. They point out that other data sets containing 
related data will inevitably be released, allowing someone to link data in 
both sets and reidentify individuals in the first data set.
5
 Defenders of 
anonymization counter that despite the theoretical and demonstrated 
ability to mount such attacks, the likelihood of reidentification for most 
data sets remains minimal and, as a practical matter, most data sets will 
remain anonymized using established techniques.
6
 
These divergent views might lead us to different regulatory 
approaches. Those that focus on the remote possibility of reidentification 
might prefer an approach that reserves punishment only in the rare 
instance of harm, such as a negligence or strict liability regime revolving 
around harm triggers. Critics of anonymization might suggest we 
abandon deidentification-based approaches altogether, in favor of 
different privacy protections focused on collection, use, and disclosure 




                                                     
users). 
3. For the details of the Netflix incident, see infra text accompanying notes 36–39.  
4. See Anthony Tockar, Riding with the Stars: Passenger Privacy in the NYC Taxicab Dataset, 
NEUSTAR (Sept. 15, 2014), http://research.neustar.biz/author/atockar [https://perma.cc/EJP5-5A3W] 
(describing the reidentification of a dataset consisting of “details about every taxi ride (yellow cabs) 
in New York in 2013, including the pickup and drop off times, locations, fare and tip amounts, as 
well as anonymized (hashed) versions of the taxi’s license and medallion numbers”). 
5. See infra Section I.A.1.  
6. See, e.g., Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2–3 
(2011), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v25/25HarvJLTech1.pdf [https://perma.cc/76ZM-
LSYW]; ANN CAVOUKIAN & KHALED EL EMAM, INFO. & PRIVACY COMM’R OF ONT., DISPELLING 
THE MYTHS SURROUNDING DEIDENTIFICATION: ANONYMIZATION REMAINS A STRONG TOOL FOR 
PROTECTING PRIVACY (2011), http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/anonymization.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/43XQ-CGEH]. 
7. See generally ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY (2005), 
http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VPE-FKAB].  
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There is a better focus for the data release law and policy: the process 
of minimizing risk. The main thesis of this Article is that the best way to 
move data release policy past the alleged failures of anonymization is to 
focus on the process of minimizing risk, not preventing harm. We argue 
that focusing on process and risk can bridge the concerns of formalists 
(for whom mathematical proof is the touchstone of any meaningful 
policy) and pragmatists (for whom workable solutions should prevail 
over theoretical concerns).
8
 This change in focus reframes the debate 
away from the endpoint of perfect anonymity and toward the process of 
risk management. 
In order to develop a clear, flexible, and workable legal framework 
for data releases, we propose drawing from the related, more established 
area of data security. Data security law is process-based, contextual, and 
tolerant of harm, so long as procedures to minimize risk are 
implemented ex ante. The law of data security focuses on requiring 
reasonable processes that decrease the likelihood of harm, even if threats 
are remote. Because there is no such thing as perfect data protection, 
data security policy is focused on regular risk assessment, the 
implementation of technical, physical, and procedural safeguards, and 
the appropriate response once a system or data set has been 
compromised. 
Data security policy also largely refrains from overly specific rules, 
deferring instead to a reasonable adherence to industry standards. As the 
motivation for a consistent approach to releasing personal data increases, 
industry standards will inevitably develop in coordination with public 
policy and consumer protection goals. In short, the law of data release 
should look more like the law of data security. 
The path for a process-based data release policy can be seen in 
nascent efforts by regulators. For example, according to the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC): 
[D]ata is not “reasonably linkable” [and thus excluded from 
additional data protection frameworks] to the extent that a 
company: (1) takes reasonable measures to ensure that the data 
is de-identified; (2) publicly commits not to try to re-identify the 
data; and (3) contractually prohibits downstream recipients from 
trying to re-identify the data.
9
 
                                                     
8. See infra text accompanying notes 45–54. 
9. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
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This multi-pronged approach is promising, but sound data release policy 
requires more nuance as well as attention to techniques other than 
deidentification (a term we use in this paper to refer to alteration or 
removal of identifying information to protect the identity of a data 
subject).
10
 The full spectrum of possible data release protections should 
be utilized to tailor a company’s obligations to the likely level of risk. 
We advocate a system where perfect anonymization is not the enemy 
of sound data release policy.
11
 However, we do not fully embrace the 
pragmatism advocated by defenders of anonymization. We first take 
issue with the current framing of the anonymization debate. The terms 
“anonymous” and “anonymization” should be largely abandoned in our 
data release policy and discourse. Almost all uses of the terms to 
describe the safety of data sets are misleading, and often they are 
deceptive.
12
 Focusing on the language of process and risk will better set 
expectations. 
Additionally, anonymization critics have rightfully pointed out that it 
is a mistake to rely too much upon risk assessments that are not scalable 
and are not able to account for either new data inputs or increasingly 
sophisticated analytical techniques.
13
 An effective risk-based approach 
to releasing data—combined with a transition away from existing 
privacy laws that treat personally identifiable data (PII) as their subject 
matter while leaving non-PII unregulated—should accommodate risk 
models and support important baseline protections for consumers. 
In this Article, we aim to use the lessons learned from the criticism 
and defense of anonymization to propose a policy-driven and 
comprehensive process-based framework for minimizing the risk of 
reidentification and sensitive attribute disclosure. We identify the 
                                                     
[https://perma.cc/R32U-M64B].  
10. See Khaled El Emam & Bradley Malin, Appendix B: Concepts and Methods for De-
identifying Clinical Trial Data, in SHARING CLINICAL TRIAL DATA: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS, 
MINIMIZING RISK 203, 214 (Inst. of Med. ed., 2015) [hereinafter IOM STUDY] (distinguishing 
identity versus attribute disclosure); Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1117, 1152 (2013) (same); SIMSON L. GARFINKEL, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & 
TECH., DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION iii, 1–2 (2015), 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/NIST.IR.8053.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RFL-X6AS] 
[hereinafter NIST REPORT]. Like Wu and El Emam & Malin, we focus on sensitive attribute 
disclosure.  
11. “Data release policy” typically refers to the release of data and related resources to the 
scientific community for research purposes. We use the term more broadly to refer to the voluntary 
or mandatory release of data to scientists, business partners, or the general public for any legitimate 
reason.  
12. See infra Section III.B. 
13. See infra Section I.A.3. 
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relevant risk factors and techniques that can mitigate that risk. By 
shifting from output to process, we can move past the anonymization 
stalemate between the formalists and the pragmatists driving this debate. 
This approach recognizes that there is no perfect anonymity. It 
focuses on process rather than output. Yet effective risk-based data 
release policy also avoids a ruthless pragmatism by acknowledging the 
limits of current risk projection models and building in important 
protections for individual privacy. This policy-driven, integrated, and 
comprehensive approach will help us to better protect data while 
preserving its utility. 
Our argument proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we review the 
anonymization debate and its stagnant policy. We argue that 
anonymization policy should be re-conceptualized as a data release 
policy. In Part II, we propose that data release policy should be focused 
on the process of minimizing risk. Drawing from data security law, we 
develop process-based data release policy as a holistic, contextual, and 
risk-tolerant approach. Finally, in Part III, we build upon the FTC’s 
process-based approach to protecting data subjects to identify how the 
full spectrum of techniques from the field of statistical disclosure 
limitations can be used to tailor data release obligations to risk. We 
identify specific risk vectors such as data volume, data sensitivity, type 
of data recipient, data use, data treatment technique, data access controls, 
and consent and consumer expectations.
14
 We propose several legal 
reforms to implement process-based data release policy, including a 
general requirement for “reasonable” data release protections and a 
prohibition on deceptive deidentification. 
The revelation that purportedly anonymized data sets were vulnerable 
to attack was a wake-up call for companies, regulators, and the public. 
Yet despite years of scholarly attention, policy has yet to respond fully. 
By focusing on the steps required to mitigate risk rather than the actual 
elimination of harm, data sets can be better shared while still protecting 
data subjects. 
I. THE ANONYMIZATION DEBATE IS STAGNANT AND IS 
NOT ADVANCING POLICY 
Anonymization was not always a contentious concept. For years, 
scholars, professionals, and policymakers were content with the notion 
                                                     
14. See infra text accompanying notes 162–174. 
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that anonymized data sets were safe.
15
 But around fifteen years ago, 
anonymization began to seem fallible. High-profile cases of 
reidentification attracted media attention and became lightning rods for 
critics and defenders of deidentification as a technique to protect 
personal information.
16
 The alleged failure of anonymization seemingly 
threw deidentification policy discussions into chaos. Fifteen years in, the 
debate has led to polarization, and policy discussions are now splintered. 
While policymakers like the FTC and the Article 29 Working Group 
have taken note of deidentification’s limits,17 they have largely ignored 
developments in adjacent fields such as differential privacy. They also 
lack an integrated vision of the full spectrum of techniques for safely 
releasing data sets. Meanwhile, privacy law remains largely unchanged. 
Why has the anonymization debate had such little impact on privacy 
law? Part of the reason might be that the debate too often fixates on 
high-profile cases in which a researcher develops and applies a method 
for reidentifying individuals in a deidentified data set or demonstrates 
the feasibility of an attack by publishing a proof-of-concept. The news 
media turns these research results into anecdotes proving the failure (if 
not the death) of anonymity.
18
 A major problem with this narrative is 
that it overemphasizes one method (deidentification) at the expense of 
other methods in the full spectrum of data release techniques. 
Because of their outsized role in policy discussions, the high-profile 
cases are key to understanding the shortcomings of the current policy 
debate. Thus, this Part revisits a few of the original attacks and proof-of-
concept papers with a critical eye to understanding how and why 
                                                     
15. Ohm, supra note 2, at 1710–11. 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 18–25. 
17. For the FTC, see supra note 9; for the Article 29 Working Group, see infra note 189. 
18. For objections to the “death of anonymization” narrative, see, for example, Jane Yakowitz 
Bambauer, Is De-Identification Dead Again?, INFO/L. BLOG (Apr. 28, 2015), 
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2015/04/28/is-de-identification-dead-again/ 
[https://perma.cc/CQ47-B53U]; Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, Reporting Fail: The Reidentification of 
Personal Genome Project Participants, INFO/L. BLOG (May 1, 2013), 
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2013/05/01/reporting-fail-the-reidentification-of-personal-
genome-project-participants/ [https://perma.cc/JJ9N-UZZS]; Daniel Barth-Jones, The Antidote for 
“Anecdata”: A Little Science Can Separate Data Privacy Facts from Folklore, INFO/L. BLOG (Nov. 
21, 2014), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2014/11/21/the-antidote-for-anecdata-a-little-
science-can-separate-data-privacy-facts-from-folklore/ [https://perma.cc/D5EC-5LGV]; Daniel C. 
Barth-Jones, Press and Reporting Considerations for Recent Re-Identification Demonstration 
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deidentification failed, what this implies for data release policy, and the 
strengths and weaknesses of alternative methods. 
A. Survey of Data Release Problems and Solutions 
 This Section begins by explaining in layman’s terms how 
deidentification works and why deidentified data sets are vulnerable to 
reidentification attacks as exemplified by two well-known cases. We 
also examine the impasse between the two leading camps in the 
deidentification debate—we dub them “pragmatists” and “formalists”—
and their sharp disagreement over the risks of reidentification. Next, we 
situate the deidentification debate within the spectrum of data release 
techniques, which includes not only deidentification but also access 
controls and query-based methods such as differential privacy. Finally, 
we consider whether “open data” is a precondition of scientific progress, 
developing a case study around recent developments in genomic data 
sharing policy. 
1. Deidentification and Reidentification 
The term deidentification
19
 has been defined several different ways. In 
this paper, we adopt the usage in a recent National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) Report, which defines deidentification as “a tool 
that organizations can use to remove personal information from data that 
they collect, use, archive, and share with other organizations.”20 As we 
describe below, we consider the term deidentification distinct from the 
concept of “anonymity” or “anonymization,” which we argue implicitly 
guarantees protection of identity. Others use deidentification and 
anonymization interchangeably; we do not. 
The most basic step in deidentification is to remove direct identifiers 
(i.e., those data that directly identify a unique individual, such as name 
or social security number) or replace them with pseudonyms or random 
values. This step is often unwisely passed off as anonymizing data.
21
 
Unfortunately, it often proves inadequate against reidentification, which 
                                                     
19. Terms in italics are defined in Appendix: A Glossary of Terms.  
20. NIST REPORT, supra note 10, at 1; Wu, supra note 10, at 1152 (distinguishing identity versus 
attribute disclosure); see also IOM STUDY, supra note 10, at 214 (same).  
21. See Daniel C. Barth-Jones, Public Policy Considerations for Recent Re-Identification 
Demonstration Attacks on Genomic Data Sets: Part 1 (Re-Identification Symposium), BILL HEALTH 
HARV. L. BLOG (May 29, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2013/05/ 
29/public-policy-considerations-for-recent-re-identification-demonstration-attacks-on-genomic-
data-sets-part-1-re-identification-symposium/ [https://perma.cc/Y85F-DVPD].  
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is the process of attempting to determine the identities of the data 
subjects whose identifiers have been removed from the data set.
22
 For 
example, in a linkage attack, an adversary (any individual or entity 
trying to reidentify a data subject) takes advantage of auxiliary (or 
background or outside) information to link an individual to a record in 
the deidentified data set.
23
 
A well-known example in the literature concerns the hospitalization 
records of Governor Weld of Massachusetts.
24
 A state insurance agency 
was obligated to release certain hospitalization records to the public for 
research purposes after first removing direct identifiers while leaving 
demographic data (birthday, ZIP code, gender) and sensitive health data. 
Latanya Sweeney obtained the deidentified hospital records, matched 
them with publicly available voter registration records (which contained 
similar demographic data), and reidentified Governor Weld by isolating 




Linkage attacks, however, are much more complicated than they 
sound. The scenario above assumes that the targeted data subject is 
represented in both data sets (the hospital records and the voter rolls), 
that the matching variables are recorded identically in both, and that the 
linked data elements uniquely distinguish an individual. Sweeney’s 
successful linkage attack met all of these conditions, but the rate of 
success in reidentification attacks is very low, for reasons discussed in 
the next Section. 
2. Quasi-Identifiers and the Auxiliary Information Problem 
The usual way to hinder linkage attacks is to alter common attributes 
(like birthday, ZIP code, and gender) and other quasi-identifiers. A 
quasi-identifier does not itself “identify a specific individual but can be 
aggregated and ‘linked’ with other information to identify data 
subjects.”26 Indeed, one of the most complicated parts of protecting 
                                                     
22. NIST REPORT, supra note 10, at 9. 
23. Id. at 17–18. Voter registration records are a good example of auxiliary information. Other 
sources include any public record (whether maintained by a government agency or a commercial 
data broker), newspapers, social media, or data deliberately shared on social networking sites. 
24. See Latanya Sweeney, k-Anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy, 10 INT’L J. ON 
UNCERTAINTY, FUZZINESS & KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS 557, 558–59 (2002). For a full account 
of the Weld reidentification, see Ohm, supra note 2, at 1719–20.  
25. Sweeney, supra note 24, at 558–59. 
26. NIST REPORT, supra note 10, at 19.  
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against linkage attacks is distinguishing identifiers from potentially 
identifying links to a person. 
The challenge in altering quasi-identifiers is that they convey useful 
information that might be important for later analysis. Thus, rather than 
remove the quasi-identifiers (which may severely limit the utility of the 
released data set), data custodians rely on generalization (e.g., changing 
date of birth to month or year of birth), suppression (e.g., removing a 
value in a record that makes it an outlier, such as a diagnosis of a very 
rare disease), and more sophisticated techniques including rounding, 
randomization (adding noise to the data), sampling, and swapping.
27
 
A popular method for altering quasi-identifiers using generalization 
and suppression is Sweeney’s concept of k-anonymity28 which “requires 
the data administrator to ensure that, given what the adversary already 
knows, the adversary can never narrow down the set of potential target 
records to fewer than k records in the released data.”29 A weakness in 
this approach is that k-anonymity assumes that only a small number of 
attributes may be used as quasi-identifiers for purposes of a linkage 
attack. Several researchers have taken issue with this claim. 
For example, Cynthia Dwork has demonstrated that some formal 
definitions of privacy are impossible, in part because there is simply too 
much auxiliary information attackers can draw from.
30
 It is virtually 
always possible to learn something about individuals from deidentified 
data sets. In a later paper, Dwork describes the auxiliary information 
problem as follows: “in any ‘reasonable’ setting there is a piece of 
information that is in itself innocent, yet in conjunction with even a 
modified (noisy) version of the data yields a privacy breach.”31 
Similarly, Charu Aggarwal has argued that it is a mistake to assume 
there are a limited number of quasi-identifiers in high dimensional or 
“sparse” data sets.32 In such contexts almost any variable may function 
                                                     
27. Id. at 20. For an eleven-step, risk-based process for deidentifying data using these techniques, 
see IOM STUDY, supra note 10, at 240–43.  
28. See Sweeney, supra note 24, at 572.  
29. Wu, supra note 10, at 1142.  
30. Cynthia Dwork, Differential Privacy, in 33RD INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM ON AUTOMATA, 
LANGUAGES AND PROGRAMMING PART II, at 1, 2 (2006), research.microsoft.com/ 
pubs/64346/dwork.pdf [https://perma.cc/TCB7-PKAX].  
31. Cynthia Dwork & Moni Naor, On the Difficulties of Disclosure Prevention in Statistical 
Databases or the Case for Differential Privacy, 2 J. PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY 93, 93 (2010). 
32. See Charu C. Aggarwal, On k-Anonymity and the Curse of Dimensionality, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE 31ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON VERY LARGE DATA BASES 901, 909 (2005), 
http://www.vldb2005.org/program/paper/fri/p901-aggarwal.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ9E-HQDV]. A 
“sparse” data set is one in which each individual record contains values only for a small fraction of 
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 Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov have 
made a similar point.
34
 In a later paper they concluded “any attribute can 
be identifying in combination with others.”35 This potentially devastating 
objection to deidentification is known as the auxiliary information 
problem. 
In this age of big data, the privacy risks of large data sets are 
especially relevant. Narayanan and Shmatikov demonstrated this by 
showing how a small amount of auxiliary information could be used to 
reidentify individuals in the Netflix Prize data set. Netflix offered a prize 
for improvements to its recommendation algorithm and provided 
contestants with access to a data set consisting of “more than 100 million 
ratings from over 480 thousand randomly-chosen, anonymous customers 
on nearly 18 thousand movie titles.”36 It “anonymized” the data set by 
removing all PII from customer records and replacing all identifiers with 
randomly assigned IDs, leaving only movie ratings and the date of rating 
for each customer. 
Did Narayanan and Shmatikov succeed in re-identifying all 480,000 
Netflix customer names in the released data set? No, but this was never 
their goal.
37
 Rather, they obtained the records of about fifty users of the 
publicly available Internet Movie Database (IMDb) and linked this data 
to two users in the Netflix database.
38
 Still, their results may be viewed 
as a proof-of-concept for how to reidentify all records in the Netflix 




Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and his colleagues have extended this 
work by publishing important studies of deidentified mobile phone and 
                                                     
attributes. For example, Amazon’s shopping database is sparse because while Amazon sells millions 
of items, the shopping history of any single customer contains only a tiny fraction of them. Sparse 
data sets include not only recommendation systems but also any real-world data sets of individual 
transactions or preferences. See Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-Anonymization 
of Large Sparse Datasets, 2008 29TH IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 111. 
33. Aggarwal, supra note 32, at 909. 
34. See Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 32. 
35. Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Myths and Fallacies of “Personally Identifiable 
Information,” 53 COMM. ACM 24, 26 (2010) (emphasis in original).  
36. The Netflix Prize Rules, NETFLIX (2006), http://www.netflixprize.com/assets/rules.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8XUU-G4GK].  
37. Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 32, at 122.  
38. Id.  
39. Their paper describes a robust “de-anonymization” algorithm that succeeded in identifying 
ninety-nine percent of the records in the Netflix data set from “8 movie ratings (of which 2 may be 
completely wrong) and dates that may have a 14-day error.” Id. at 121.  
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credit card metadata. De Montjoye introduced the concept of “unicity” 
to quantify “how much outside information one would need, on average, 
to reidentify a specific and known user in a simply anonymized data 
set.”40 Not surprisingly, the higher a data set’s unicity, the easier it is to 
reidentify data subjects in the anonymized data. Mobile phone metadata 
is highly unique and therefore can be reidentified using little outside 
information.
41
 The same is roughly true of credit card data.
42
 Although 
de Montjoye recognizes that further work is needed, he and his 
colleagues consider it likely “that most large-scale metadata sets—for 
example, browsing history, financial records, and transportation and 
mobility data—will have a high unicity.”43 Social network data should 
also be added to this list.
44
 
3. The Debate Between Formalists and Pragmatists 
Does the auxiliary information problem sound the death knell of 
deidentification, or does it remain a viable strategy for protecting the 
privacy of data subjects? More than a dozen interchanges among the 
experts show that they are deeply divided, not only in how they view the 
implications of the auxiliary information problem, but in their goals, 
methods, interests, and measures of success.
45
 
                                                     
40. Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Shopping Mall: On the Reidentifiability of 
Credit Card Metadata, 347 SCI. 536, 537 (2015). A “simply anonymized data set” is one from 
which obvious identifiers have been removed—names, home, address, phone numbers, and other 
forms of PII. Id.  
41. See Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Human 
Mobility, 3 SCI. REP. 1, 2 (2013) (showing that only four spatiotemporal points are enough to 
uniquely reidentify ninety-five percent of mobile phone users). This is intuitively obvious: A’s 
mobile phone data consists of the set of A’s locations at specific times as recorded by a mobile 
operator whenever A initiates or receives a call or a text message, or otherwise connect to a cell 
tower. And there are very few people besides A who are in the same place at the same time on 
multiple occasions.  
42. See de Montjoye et al., supra note 40, at 537 (showing that only four spatiotemporal points 
are enough to uniquely reidentify ninety percent of shoppers using credit cards). 
43. Id. at 539.  
44. See, e.g., Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, De-Anonymizing Social Networks, in 2009 
30TH IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 173 (demonstrating effectiveness of new 
reidentification algorithm targeting anonymized social network graphs by showing that a third of 
verified users with accounts on both Twitter and Flickr can be reidentified in the anonymous Twitter 
graph with only a twelve percent error rate). 
45. See, e.g., Daniel Barth-Jones et al., Letter to the Editor, Assessing Data Intrusion Threats, 348 
SCI. 194 (2015); Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye & Alex “Sandy” Pentland, Letter to the Editor, 
Response, 348 SCI. 195 (2015); ANN CAVOUKIAN & DAN CASTRO, INFO. & PRIVACY COMM’N OF 
ONT., BIG DATA AND INNOVATION, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: DEIDENTIFICATION DOES 
WORK (2014), http://www2.itif.org/2014-big-data-deidentification.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK2F-
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The computer scientists, epidemiologists, and statisticians whom we 
refer to as pragmatists—including El Emam and Barth-Jones—share an 
expertise in deidentification methods and value practical solutions for 
sharing useful data to advance the public good. Accordingly, they devote 
a great deal of effort to devising methods for measuring and managing 
the risk of reidentification for clinical trials and other specific disclosure 
scenarios.
46
 Unlike those who invent linkage attacks, pragmatists 
consider it difficult to gain access to auxiliary information and give little 
weight to attacks demonstrating that data subjects are distinguishable 
and unique but that fail to reidentify anyone.
47
 Rather, they argue that 
empirical studies and meta-analyses show that the risk of reidentification 
in properly deidentified data sets is, in fact, very low.
48
 
                                                     
PK5V]; CAVOUKIAN & EL EMAM, supra note 6; ARVIND NARAYANAN & EDWARD W. FELTEN, NO 
SILVER BULLET: DE-IDENTIFICATION STILL DOESN’T WORK (2014), http://randomwalker.info/ 
publications/no-silver-bullet-de-identification.pdf [https://perma.cc/N365-448N]; Khaled El Emam 
& Luke Arbuckle, De-Identification: A Critical Debate, FUTURE PRIVACY F. (July 24, 2014), 
https://fpf.org/2014/07/24/de-identification-a-critical-debate/ [https://perma.cc/L873-KCVQ]; 
Barth-Jones, supra note 21; Daniel Barth-Jones, Re-Identification Risks and Myths, Superusers and 
Super Stories (Part I: Risks and Myths), CONCURRING OPINIONS (Sept. 6, 2012), 
http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/09/re-identification-risks-and-myths-superusers-and-
super-stories-part-i-risks-and-myths.html [https://perma.cc/3ZK5-5PX7]; Ed Felten, Reader 
Comment, Re-Identification Risks and Myths, Superusers and Super Stories (Part I: Risks and 
Myths), CONCURRING OPINIONS (Sept. 6, 2012, 8:20 PM and Sept. 7, 2012, 8:57 PM), 
http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/09/re-identification-risks-and-myths-superusers-and-
super-stories-part-i-risks-and-myths.html [https://perma.cc/3ZK5-5PX7]; Arvind Narayanan, 
Reidentification as Basic Science (Re-Identification Symposium), BILL HEALTH HARV. L. BLOG 
(May 26, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2013/05/26/reidentification-as-basic-
science/ [https://perma.cc/T6JJ-3BCC].  
46. See IOM STUDY, supra note 10, at 233–34 (describing the level of acceptable risks in terms 
of factors such as the available deidentification techniques; the extent to which a disclosure would 
invade the privacy to data subjects—which in turn depends on the sensitivity of the data, the 
potential injury from an inappropriate disclosure, and the nature and scope of any consent that 
participants may have provided—and the motives and capacity of likely adversaries). 
47. See, e.g., Barth-Jones, supra note 21.  
48. See, e.g., Kathleen Benitez & Bradley Malin, Evaluating Re-Identification Risks with Respect 
to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 17 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 169, 169 (2010) (estimating that 
the percentage of a state’s population vulnerable to unique reidentification using a voter registration 
list to perform a linkage attack ranged from 0.01% to 0.25%); Deborah Lafkey, The Safe Harbor 
Method of De-Identification: An Empirical Test (Oct. 8, 2009), www.ehcca.com/presentations/ 
HIPAAWest4/lafky_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Y25-GPZE] (statistical experts analyzing 
approximately 15,000 deidentified patient records found only 216 unique profiles in the deidentified 
data set, and only 28 potential matches—using age, gender, and ZIP as quasi-identifiers—and were 
able to accurately reidentify only two data subjects, giving a verified match rate of 0.013%); Khaled 
El Emam et al., A Systematic Review of Re-Identification Attacks on Health Data, 6 PLOS ONE 1, 
8–9 (2011) (meta-analysis of fourteen reidentification attempts found relatively high rate of 
reidentification (twenty-six percent across all studies and thirty-four percent for attacks on health 
data) but successful reidentification events typically involved small data sets that had not been 
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Formalists, on the other hand, are all computer scientists like Dwork, 
Narayanan (and his colleague Edward Felten), Shmatikov, and de 
Montjoye.
49
 They insist on mathematical rigor in defining privacy, 
modeling adversaries, and quantifying the probability of reidentification. 
Dwork, in particular, seeks provable privacy guarantees using methods 
first developed in cryptography.
50
 Formalists argue that efforts to 
quantify the efficacy of deidentification “are unscientific and promote a 
false sense of security by assuming unrealistic, artificially constrained 
models of what an adversary might do.”51 Similarly, they take seriously 
proof-of-concept demonstrations while minimizing the importance of 
empirical studies showing low rates of reidentification. 
Their disagreements arise because pragmatists and formalists 
represent distinctive disciplines with very different histories, questions, 
methods, and objectives. Their disagreements play out in what Seda 
Gürses calls “a terrain of contestations.”52 Even though there are 
important differences between them, both approaches offer valuable 
insights in formulating data release policies. From a policy standpoint, it 
is misguided to fixate on which approach is correct, and far more 
productive to figure out where they come together. 
Granted, the pragmatists see value in their practical approach, 
although the problem of auxiliary information cautions against over-
confidence in how they think about risk assessment. At the same time, 
some leading pragmatists concede that a highly formal approach like 
differential privacy “has a number of important strengths, but also faces 
a number of empirical and practical barriers to its deployment in 
healthcare settings.”53 On the other hand, formalists see value in their 
                                                     
deidentified according to existing standards). 
49. We omit Latanya Sweeney because she has a foot in both camps. 
50. Differential privacy is the paradigmatic example of formalism. It seeks to place privacy on a 
mathematically rigorous foundation, thereby enabling computer scientists “to argue formally about 
the degree of risk in a sequence of queries.” Cynthia Dwork & Rebecca Pottenger, Towards 
Practicing Privacy, 20 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 102, 102 (2013), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3555331/pdf/amiajnl-2012-001047.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z2TL-5CRY]. In this paper, Dwork and Pottenger dismiss deidentification as a 
“sanitization pipe dream.” Id. On the other hand, they concede that setting a “privacy budget” based 
on the “different types of data, or even different types of queries against data, may make sense, but 
these are policy questions that the math does not attempt to address.” Id. at 106. 
51. See NARAYANAN & FELTEN, supra note 45; de Montjoye & Pentland, supra note 45.  
52. See Seda Gürses, “Privacy Is Don’t Ask, Confidentiality Is Don’t Tell”: An Empirical Study 
of Privacy Definitions, Assumptions and Methods in Computer Science Research (2013) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
53. Bradley A. Malin et al., Biomedical Data Privacy: Problems, Perspectives, and Recent 
Advances, 20 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 1, 5 (2013); see also Fida K. Dankar & Khaled El 
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more rigorous approach, notwithstanding practical implementation 
challenges.
54
 At the same time, even Dwork concedes that the literature 
on statistics “contains a wealth of privacy supportive techniques and 
investigations of their impact on the statistics of the data set” while 
insisting that “[r]igorous definitions of privacy and modeling of the 
adversary are not prominent features of this portion of the literature.”55 
Is there a way forward that recognizes the limits of deidentification 
without abandoning it while embracing the full spectrum of techniques 
to protect the identity and attributes of data subjects? We believe the first 
step is recognizing that deidentification techniques are only part of a 
larger approach to protecting the privacy and confidentiality of data 
subjects known as statistical disclosure limitation (SDL).
56
 We argue 
below that SDL provides the broader context in which to understand and 
evaluate a range of protective techniques. Our brief examination of SDL 
sets the stage for overcoming the divide between pragmatists and 
formalists and reformulating the policy debate along more productive 
lines. 
4. Statistical Disclosure Limitation 
SDL comprises the principles and techniques that researchers have 
developed for disseminating official statistics and other data for research 
purposes while protecting the privacy and confidentiality of data 
subjects. Satkartar Kinney describes SDL in terms of three major forms 
of interaction between researchers (whom she refers to as users) and 




Direct access encompasses both licensed data, which allows users 
who click-through the applicable licensing terms to perform any data 
query and receive full results, and authorized access to research data 
                                                     
Emam, Practicing Differential Privacy in Health Care: A Review, 5 TRANSACTIONS ON DATA 
PRIVACY 35 (2013). 
54. Making differential privacy more practical is an ongoing area of research. See, e.g., Putting 
Differential Privacy to Work, U. PA. DEP’T COMPUTER & INFO. SCI., http://privacy.cis.upenn.edu/ 
[https://perma.cc/F5TK-KC79] (last visited Apr. 11, 2016).  
55. Dwork & Naor, supra note 31, at 94. 
56. See generally Satkartar K. Kinney et al., Data Confidentiality: The Next Five Years Summary 
and Guide to Papers, 1 J. PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY 125 (2009) (describing SDL methods). 
This field of research is also more intuitively known as statistical disclosure control. See, e.g., ANCO 
HUNDEPOOL ET AL., STATISTICAL DISCLOSURE CONTROL (1st ed. 2012). 
57. Kinney et al., supra note 56, at 127 fig.1. 
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centers, which also allows any query but only returns vetted results.
58
 
Direct access imposes the fewest restrictions on data but limits data 
access to qualified investigators who must agree to licensing terms or 
execute a Data Use Agreement (DUA), which may also stipulate 
security measures and prohibit redistribution of the data sets or attempts 
to reidentify or contact data subjects.
59
 Alternatively, an agency (such as 
the Census Bureau) may host the data at a research center and provide 
access to data sets under agreement at secure enclaves,
60
 or license users 
to access data remotely via secure internet portals.
61
 In any case, direct 
access methods avoid many of the reidentification issues discussed 
above by never releasing data sets to the general public, thereby 
thwarting linkage attacks. 
 Dissemination-based access refers to the practice of publicly 
releasing reduced, altered, or synthetic data (i.e., hypothetical data that 
have similar characteristics to the real data). Like direct access, it allows 
full results to any query.
62
 The data custodian applies various techniques 
to construct the transformed data set before publicly releasing it 
(although users may have to register or consent to terms of use that 
contain few if any of the restrictions in DUAs). In short, this form of 
access combines public release of data with masking of data sets by 
methods including generalization and suppression. Deidentification falls 
into the SDL sub-category of dissemination-based access. 
Query-based access allows users to interact with the data by posing 
queries, typically over a secure internet connection.
63
 Kinney identifies 
several sub-categories of query-based access, including remote analysis 
servers and differential privacy. Remote analysis servers allow 
researchers to analyze confidential data without ever seeing the 
underlying data, although both the queries they can pose and the results 
they can obtain may be subject to limitations. Another sub-category of 
query-based access, differential privacy, is a set of techniques developed 
by Dwork.
64
 In this framework, the query results (analyses) are altered, 
often by adding noise, so that released information does not reveal any 
                                                     
58. Vetted results typically involve “forbidding users access to confidentiality-threatening items.” 
Id.  
59. Id. at 128. 
60. Id. 
61. Id.  
62. Id. at 128–29. 
63. Id. at 129.  
64. See Dwork, supra note 30, at 3. 
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person’s data with certainty. According to Dwork, differential privacy 
“addresses all concerns that any participant might have about the leakage 
of his or her personal information, regardless of any auxiliary 
information known to an adversary: [e]ven if the participant removed her 
data from the dataset, no outputs . . . would become significantly more 
or less likely.”65 The key point about query-based access is that users 
rely on techniques that allow useful statistical queries without the need 
for having any direct access to the underlying data sets. This too avoids 
most of the reidentification issues discussed above.
66
 
Kinney’s analysis helps clarify several contested issues in the current 
debate over deidentification. First, as Kinney points out, the most urgent 
need is for research that “provides agencies methods and tools for 
making sound decisions about SDL.”67 Second, her taxonomy calls 
attention to the fact that researchers in statistics and computer science 
pursue very different approaches to confidentiality and privacy and often 
in isolation from one another. They might achieve better results by 
collaborating across methodological divides.
68
 Third, the legal scholars 
who have written most forcefully on this topic tend to evaluate the pros 
and cons of deidentification in isolation from other SDL methods.
69
 
Debates that focus exclusively on the merits of deidentification are only 
part of the story.
70
 
5. Open Data 
Much of the deidentification debate overlaps with discussions about 
open data, which refers to “information that is accessible to everyone, 
                                                     
65. Cynthia Dwork, A Firm Foundation for Private Data Analysis, 54 COMM. ACM 86, 91 
(2011).  
66. Not all query-based methods are immune from attack. See, e.g., Amatai Ziv, Israel’s 
‘Anonymous’ Statistics Surveys Aren’t So Anonymous, HAARETZ (Jan. 7, 2013), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/israel/israel-s-anonymous-statistics-surveys-aren-t-so-anonymous-
1.492256 [https://perma.cc/TR4G-E6SA] (describing an attack based on sophisticated queries from 
which the attacker can infer census responses and match them with auxiliary information).  
67. Kinney et al., supra note 56, at 131. 
68. Id. at 132. 
69. See infra Section I.B. 
70. As Salil Vadhan and his colleagues in Harvard University’s Privacy Tools for Sharing 
Research Data project point out, techniques such as “privacy-aware methods for contingency tables, 
synthetic data, data visualizations, interactive mechanisms, and multiparty computations[] have 
been successfully used to share data while protecting privacy, with no major compromises as far as 
we know.” Salil Vadhan et al., Comment Letter on Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 
Human Subjects Research Protections (Oct. 26, 2011), http://privacytools.seas.harvard.edu/files/ 
privacytools/files/commonruleanprm.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AJT-NAC4].  
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machine readable, offered online at zero cost, and has no limits on reuse 
and redistribution.”71 Adherents of an open data philosophy typically 
promote greater access to government data in order to advance the 
public good.
72
 A key argument in favor of open data within the scientific 
community is that it “promote[s] transparency, reproducibility, and more 
rapid advancement of new knowledge and discovery.”73 Scientific 
journals and funding agencies may also require that experimental data be 
made publicly available; however, additional requirements apply to data 
sets that derive from clinical studies to ensure that researchers have 
taken all steps necessary to protect the privacy of data subjects.
74
 Nor is 
it clear that the only way to make data available and shareable for the 
purposes of advancing scientific research is by adopting open data 
principles. 
Genetic research provides a powerful example of the advantages of 
controlled access. More generally, the following brief case study of 
genomic data sharing illustrates the role of legal and institutional 
arrangements in limiting the flow and use of personal data consistent 
with the privacy expectations of data subjects. 
The proliferation of genomic information for research, clinical care, 
and personal interest has opened up new reidentification attack vectors 
on DNA and other genetic data sets,
75
 forcing the scientific community 
to reconsider the privacy assurances they can offer participants in DNA 
studies.
76
 Two of the many recent genetic privacy breaches are highly 
relevant. In the first case, a group of geneticists discovered a statistical 
                                                     
71. Emmie Tran & Ginny Scholtes, Open Data Literature Review, in 19TH ANNUAL BCLT/BTLJ 
SYMPOSIUM: OPEN DATA: ADDRESSING PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS CHALLENGES 1 
(2015), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Final_OpenDataLitReview_ 
2015-04-14_1.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL5X-P5SS]; see also BUDAPEST OPEN ACCESS INITIATIVE, 
http://www.budapestopenaccessinitiative.org/ (last visited May 10, 2015). 
72. See Robert M. Goerge, Data for the Public Good: Challenges and Barriers in the Context of 
Cities, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 153 (Julia 
Lane et al. eds., 2014) (discussing various efforts to use data analysis to improve public safety, 
education, urban transportation, public housing, and so on).  
73. See IOM STUDY, supra note 10, at 141.  
74. See, e.g., Theo Bloom, Data Access for the Open Access Literature: PLOS’s Data Policy, 
PLOS (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.plos.org/data-access-for-the-open-access-literature-ploss-data-
policy/ [https://perma.cc/DD89-4U7E]; IOM STUDY, supra note 10, at 141 (recommending a 
restricted access model for holders of clinical data as opposed to open access). 
75. For an excellent survey, see generally Yaniv Erlich & Arvind Narayanan, Routes for 
Breaching and Protecting Genetic Privacy, 15 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 409 (2014). 
76. Gina Kolata, Poking Holes in Genetic Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/science/poking-holes-in-the-privacy-of-dna.html 
[https://perma.cc/PQ8U-9JXH].  
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method for analyzing a complex mixture of DNA samples from the 
HapMap database
77
 and confirming whether or not an individual’s DNA 
is present in the mixture.
78
 This study led the National Institute of Health 
(NIH) to remove aggregate genomic data from its public databases and 
place it in a controlled access database, where there are “protections and 
policies in place for appropriate data access.”79 
The second case occurred five years later, when a group of genetics 
researchers described a new statistical method for identifying individual 
data subjects from donated DNA samples. They began with Y-
chromosome data hosted in a HapMap database and searched for 
matching records in recreational genetic genealogy databases (which 
allow the public to enter their own DNA information and find relatives 
with the same surname). When the researchers found a match, they 




These two cases prompted geneticists and associated research 
institutions to reconsider existing paradigms for sharing genomic data, 
culminating in a new genomic data sharing policy, announced by the 
NIH in 2014.
81
 NIH’s final rule on genomic data sharing cites the 
Gymrek attack in the context of explaining a change in policy requiring 
investigators to obtain informed consent from prospective subjects, even 
                                                     
77. HapMap catalogues common genetic variants that occur in human beings and provides 
information that researchers can use to link genetic variants to the risk for specific illnesses, with the 
aim of developing new methods of preventing, diagnosing, and treating disease. See generally What 
Is the HapMap?, INT’L HAPMAP PROJECT, http://hapmap.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/whatishapmap.html 
[https://perma.cc/MV7G-NZ93] (last visited Apr. 11, 2016).  
78. See Kolata, supra note 76. For the technical paper describing the relevant techniques, see Nils 
Homer et al., Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts of DNA to Highly Complex 
Mixtures Using High-Density SNP Genotyping Microarrays, 4 PLOS GENETICS 1 (2008).  
79. Elias A. Zerhouni & Elizabeth G. Nabel, Letter to the Editor, Protecting Aggregate Genomic 
Data, 322 SCI. 43, 44 (2008). A year earlier, NIH had created a database of genotypes and 
phenotypes (dbGaP), which relied on a “tiered access” system to provide unprecedented access to 
the large-scale genetic and phenotypic data sets required for so-called genome wide associations 
studies, in which researchers examined many common genetic variants in different individuals to 
see if any variant is associated with a genetic trait. See Matthew D. Mailman et al., The NCBI 
dbGaP Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes, 39 NATURE GENETICS 1181 (2007). Tiered access 
allows anyone to access less sensitive study protocols and summary data without restriction, but 
requires preauthorization from sponsoring NIH programs for access to more sensitive, individual-
level data. Id. NIH also protected the confidentiality of study subjects by accepting only deidentified 
individual data into the dbGaP and releasing such data as encrypted files to authorized users who 
also had to comply with additional data security requirements. Id. at 1183. 
80. See Kolata, supra note 76. For the technical paper describing the relevant techniques, see 
Melissa Gymrek et al., Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference, 339 SCI. 321 (2013).  
81. Final NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,345 (Aug. 28, 2014). 
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if the data in question would be deidentified.
82
 While the new NIH 
policy promotes the use of consent for broad sharing, it also requires 
researchers to explain to prospective participants the risks of 
reidentification and whether or not their deidentified data will be shared 
through unrestricted or controlled-access repositories.
83
 Thus, 
deidentification, consent, and tiered access work together to provide 
multiple layers of protection. 
This brief case study of genetic reidentification illustrates two points. 
The first is that it is possible to achieve most of the benefits of open 
access without releasing data to the public with no restrictions. As the 
former director of the National Institute of Statistical Sciences observed, 
data availability in the purist sense of “openness” is not what matters 
most. Rather, the most important goal is sound “decisions by 
governments, businesses, and individuals that are based on the data.”84 
The second is that even in the face of reidentification attacks, it remains 
possible to balance participant privacy and broad accessibility of 
genomic data for research purposes by combining technical and policy 
safeguards. Rather than give up deidentification entirely, the new NIH 
policy supplements it with other mechanisms such as informed consent 
protocols and tiered access, along with new security requirements,
85
 




 The scientific 
community generally favors this balanced approach,
88
 although some 
                                                     
82. Id. at 51,347. 
83. Id. at 51,351; see also NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH SECURITY BEST PRACTICES FOR 
CONTROLLED-ACCESS DATA SUBJECT TO THE NIH GENOMIC DATA SHARING (GDS) POLICY 
(2015), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/projects/gap/cgi-bin/GetPdf.cgi?document_name=dbgap_2b_ 
security_procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/BLC7-LLVC]. 
84. ALAN F. KARR, NAT’L INST. OF STATISTICAL SCIS., WHY DATA AVAILABILITY IS SUCH A 
HARD PROBLEM, TECHNICAL REPORT 186 (2014), http://www.niss.org/sites/default/files/tr186.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/93CY-Z68F]; see also NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 83. 
85. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 83. 
86. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, GENOMIC DATA USER CODE OF CONDUCT (2010) [hereinafter 
NIH CODE OF CONDUCT], http://gds.nih.gov/pdf/Genomic_Data_User_Code_of_Conduct.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4CFP-GR6J]. 
87. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, MODEL DATA USE CERTIFICATION AGREEMENT (2013), 
https://dbgap.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/aa/wga.cgi?view_pdf&stacc=phs000016.v1.p1 
[https://perma.cc/2MHL-R6LG]. Both the NIH CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 86, and the DUA 
explicitly prohibit the use of genomic data sets to identify or contact data subjects.  
88. See, e.g., George Church et al., Public Access to Genome-Wide Data: Five Views on 
Balancing Research with Privacy and Protection, 5 PLOS GENETICS 1 (2009), 
http://journals.plos.org/plosgenetics/article/asset?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pgen.1000665.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/2K8L-7WVX]; Catherine Heeney et al., Assessing the Privacy Risks of Data 
Sharing in Genomics, 14 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 17 (2010); WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, MED. 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ACCESS TO COLLECTIONS OF DATA AND MATERIALS FOR HEALTH RESEARCH: 
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geneticists would prefer greater use of open access
89
 and/or a more 
dynamic form of consent.
90
 
B. Moving Past the Deidentification Debate 
The deidentification debate—which pits those who reject 
deidentification as irretrievably flawed against those who defend both its 
ongoing validity and practical value—has greatly overshadowed 
successful policy outcomes like NIH’s new genomic data sharing policy. 
Experts in the field of genomics achieved the latter by careful 
deliberation and compromise. In contrast, the privacy scholarship seems 
fixated on the deidentification debates, with opposing sides taking 
extreme positions and making overly general claims about data release 
policy across all disciplines. 
For example, Paul Ohm insists that deidentification is a failure and 
should be abandoned.
91
 In the opposing corner, Jane (Yakowitz) 
Bambauer and Daniel Barth-Jones have argued that the famous trio of 
reidentification attacks (Weld, AOL, and Netflix) distorts the policy 
debate because they are not representative or have been misrepresented 
in popular media.
92
 Like Ohm, we credit these attacks for demonstrating 
shortcomings with deidentification techniques. But we argue they should 
be used differently. Instead of focusing on what they illustrate about the 
failure of anonymization, the attacks show what data custodians can 
learn from past mistakes, while encouraging them to experiment with 
new techniques and institutional arrangements. 
In this Part, we review the deidentification literature to see if it is 
really as divided as it seems. There are distinct arguments and 
ideologies, but they are often isolated or concern more specific aspects 
of deidentification. We suggest that a careful reading of the privacy 
scholarship against the backdrop of our earlier analysis of SDL and 
related topics reveals a rough consensus that can be used to develop data 
release policy around the concept of minimizing risk. 
                                                     
A REPORT TO THE MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL AND THE WELLCOME TRUST (2006), 
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@msh_grants/documents/web_document/
wtx030842.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWV6-58H4] (acknowledging the importance of controlling 
access to sensitive health information). 
89. See, e.g., Laura L. Rodriguez et al., The Complexities of Genomic Identifiability, 339 SCI. 275 
(2013). 
90. See, e.g., Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, No Longer De-Identified, 312 SCI. 370 
(2006); Stacey Pereira et al., Open Access Data Sharing in Genomic Research, 5 GENES 739 (2014). 
91. Ohm, supra note 2.  
92. See supra notes 15–21. 
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1. Ohm v. Yakowitz 
Ohm’s highly influential article treats deidentification—or what he 
calls “release-and-forget anonymization”—as fool’s gold.93 He reads the 
computer science literature as proving the “theoretical limits” of the 
power of deidentification techniques,
94
 and argues that we should not 
expect any technical breakthroughs to “save us” or to replace the need 
for a regulatory response premised on a more realistic assessment of the 
risks of reidentification and the appropriate response.
95
 Ohm’s analysis 
accomplishes a great deal by alerting privacy regulators to the dangers of 
treating anonymization as a silver bullet. The scope of many privacy 
laws depends on whether information is identifiable or not, and Ohm’s 
critique raises legitimate questions about defining the scope of privacy 
laws by reference to this distinction. He also wisely suggests that privacy 
regulators reject this longstanding binary distinction between PII and 
non-PII in favor of a more risk-based approach.
96
 
Yakowitz sought to rebut Ohm’s arguments by offering two main 
points in defense of anonymization. First, she claimed that Ohm (and 
other critics) neglected the value of the data commons, which she 
described as the “diffuse collections of data made broadly available to 
researchers with only minimal barriers to entry.”97 According to 
Yakowitz, the benefits flowing from the data commons are immense and 
range across diverse fields. Thus, if policymakers were to end or even 
restrict public data releases of deidentified data sets, society would 
suffer a new tragedy of the data commons.
98
 Second, she argues that the 
risks of reidentification are mainly theoretical and in any case highly 
exaggerated. She thus advances a proposal that would make it easier, not 
harder, to disseminate anonymized data sets.
99
 Like Ohm, Yakowitz 
makes a valuable contribution to the public policy debate by alerting 
                                                     
93. Ohm, supra note 2, at 1711–12 (noting that “when a data administrator practices these 
techniques, she releases records—either publicly, privately to a third party, or internally within her 
own organization—and then she forgets, meaning she makes no attempt to track what happens to 
the records after release”). 
94. Id. at 1751. 
95. Id. at 1759–69. 
96. Id. at 1764–68.  
97. Yakowitz, supra note 6, at 2–3.  
98. Id. at 4. 
99. Yakowitz’s proposal imposes two conditions on a data producer: “(1) strip all direct 
identifiers, and (2) either check for minimum subgroup sizes on a preset list of common indirect 
identifiers—such as race, sex, geographic indicators, and other indirect identifiers commonly found 
in public records—or use an effective random sampling frame.” Id. at 44. 
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policy makers to the opportunity costs of reduced data sharing. 
2. A Different Path 
Ohm sought to kill deidentification and used strong rhetoric as a 
weapon.
100
 Yakowitz also made a forceful argument, but hers was at the 
opposite pole.
101
 However, these extreme positions undermine the policy 
debate. By limiting their respective analyses almost exclusively to the 
release-and-forget model, both Ohm and Yakowitz largely neglect the 
full gamut of SDL techniques. Rather, they favor the dissemination-
based model in which deidentification techniques must bear the entire 
weight of balancing privacy and utility, with no help from direct access 
(which employs administrative, technical, and physical controls in 
support of controlled access) or query-based methods like differential 
privacy (which refrain from releasing data at all). 
Ohm rejected these other forms of SDL out of hand, not because they 
fail on technical grounds, but on the grounds they are “slower, more 
complex, and more expensive than simple anonymization,” “useless for 
many types of data analysis problems,” and “cannot match the sweeping 
privacy promises that once were made regarding release-and-forget 
anonymization.”102 Of course, it is ironic for Ohm to raise these 
objections given his utter lack of faith in release-and-forget 
anonymization. 
Similarly, Yakowitz does not endorse other SDL methods. This might 
be because some perceive them as inconsistent with open data. 
According to Yakowitz: “[n]early every recent public policy debate has 
benefited from mass dissemination of anonymized data.”103 But the 
necessity of open data in its purest sense is debatable. At least some of 
the examples cited by Yakowitz as evidence of this claim do not depend 
                                                     
100. According to Ohm, deidentification methods are not merely flawed but a “shared 
hallucination.” Ohm, supra note 2, at 1768. The distinction between PII and non-PII is not just in 
need of adjustment, but must be completely abandoned because the list of potential PII (or quasi-
identifiers) “will never stop growing until it includes everything.” Id. at 1742. And not only the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule, but “every privacy law and regulation” needs reassessment and revision. Id. 
at 1731. 
101. She not only criticized the computer science literature, but set out to debunk five “myths” 
about reidentification risk. Yakowitz, supra note 6, at 23–35. True risks posed by anonymization are 
not merely lower than reported but “nonexistent.” Id. at 4. And concerns over anonymization are not 
only disproportionate to the true risks, but “have all the characteristics of a moral panic.” Id. at 5. 
102. Ohm, supra note 2, at 1751. 
103. Yakowitz, supra note 6, at 9.  
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on any public release of anonymized data.
104
 More generally, as noted 
above, the values supporting openness do not rest on the public 
availability of anonymized data. Finally, the database of genotypes and 
phenotypes (dbGaP)
105
 and the favorable treatment of controlled access 
in the NIH genomic data sharing policy,
106
 and the even more recent 
IOM Study,
107
 show the value that can be had from relatively controlled 
releases of information. 
We agree with later commentators such as Felix Wu that both Ohm 
and Yakowitz have “misinterpreted, or at least overread” the relevant 
computer science literature, although in different ways.
108
 In particular, 
Ohm and Yakowitz deploy the problem of auxiliary information in 
different and problematic ways. Ohm’s article neglects the empirical 
research around deidentified health data, which shows that the risk of 
reidentification is in fact very small (although Ohm’s article preceded 
some, but not all, of this research).
109
 Yakowitz, on the other hand, treats 
the Netflix study as a “theoretical contribution,”110 while embracing the 
empirical studies of health data over the more “hypothetical risks” 
identified by popular reidentifications.
111
 But these risks are not merely 
hypothetical in light of the impressive theorems and proofs of computer 
scientists working in this field, and hence not so easily dismissed.
112
 
We highlight the opposing positions of Ohm and Yakowitz to show 
why the policy debate has stagnated. Is there an alternative path 
forward? The answer is “yes,” and the relevant headline is 
“Reidentification Is Not the End of the Story.” There is no denying that 
deidentification techniques have significant limits, especially with regard 
to internet scale data sets.
113
 But the trio of high-profile cases point in a 
                                                     
104. In at least two of the sentencing studies cited by Yakowitz, researchers were granted special 
permission to access non-public data sets. Id. at 9. 
105. See supra note 79. 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 79–83. 
107. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
108. Wu, supra note 10, at 1124. Wu advanced the discussion by carefully delineating the 
meaning of privacy and utility in different contexts, thereby enabling policymakers “to choose 
among these competing definitions.” Id. at 1125. 
109. See supra note 48. 
110. Yakowitz, supra note 6, at 26. 
111. Id. at 35. 
112. See, for example, Dwork’s proof of the auxiliary information problem, supra text 
accompanying notes 30–31, Narayanan and Shmatikov’s deanonymization algorithm and proof-of-
concept deidentification of the Netflix dataset, supra text accompanying notes 36–39, and de 
Montjoye’s study of unicity in large data sets, supra text accompanying notes 40–43. 
113. See supra Section I.A.1. 
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different direction from the usual death of anonymization narrative. 
For example, the exposure of Weld’s medical records directly 
influenced the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996
114
 (HIPAA) Privacy Rule by ensuring that it included 
deidentification requirements designed to limit the risk of linkage 
attacks, and thereby improving the privacy of health records.
115
 Both the 
AOL debacle and the Netflix attack inspired research on, respectively, 
the safe release of search logs,
116
 and privacy-preserving 
recommendations systems.
117
 Furthermore, Overstock.com learned a 
lesson from the Netflix experience by organizing a one million dollar 
contest for an improved product recommendation system in which it 
minimized risk by refraining from releasing the anonymized prize data 
set to contestants.
118
 Rather, it relied on synthetic data and a secure cloud 
                                                     
114. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936. 
115. HIPAA exempts deidentified health data from the Privacy Rule if it meets either the Safe 
Harbor standard, see 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2) (2015) (requiring the removal of eighteen 
enumerated data elements including name, geographic subdivisions smaller than a state, all date 
elements directly related to an individual other than year, contact information, and various 
identifiers), or the expert determination standard, see id. § 164.514(b)(1) (requiring an expert 
determination using “generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods” of 
deidentification that there is a “very small” risk that the deidentified information “could be used, 
alone or in combination with other reasonably available information, . . . to identify an individual 
who is a subject of the information”). Sweeney’s work on the Weld reidentification heavily 
influenced the formation of the HIPAA Safe Harbor standard. See Daniel Barth-Jones, The “Re-
Identification” of Governor William Weld’s Medical Information (2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2076397 [https://perma.cc/MN9A-7CTF] 
(arguing that if the Weld reidentification attack had taken place after the HIPAA Privacy Rule took 
effect, it would have been extremely difficult to undertake a successful linkage attack).  
116. See, e.g., Michaela Götz et al., Publishing Search Logs—A Comparative Study of Privacy 
Guarantees, 24 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE & DATA ENGINEERING 520 (2012); 
Aleksandra Korolova et al., Releasing Search Queries and Clicks Privately, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE 18TH INTERNATIONAL WORLD WIDE WEB CONFERENCE 171 (2009), http://theory.stanford.edu/ 
~korolova/Releasing_search_queries_and_clicks_privately_WWW2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
22CB-FMG9].  
117. See Frank McSherry & Ilya Mironov, Differentially Private Recommender Systems: 
Building Privacy into the Netflix Prize Contenders, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH ACM SIGKDD 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING (KDD) 627 (2009), 
http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/80511/NetflixPrivacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7P4-P3FJ] 
(describing new techniques based on differential privacy that allow researchers to work on 
improvements to the accuracy of recommendation systems without compromising privacy).  
118. See Steve Lohr, The Privacy Challenge in Online Prize Contests, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 
2011), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/the-privacy-challenge-in-online-prize-contests/ 
[https://perma.cc/RHS9-ZX29]; Rich Relevance, Overstock.com and RichRelevance Offer $1 
Million Prize to Speed Innovation in Retail Personalization, RICHRELEVANCE.COM (May 12, 2011), 
http://www.richrelevance.com/blog/2011/05/overstock-com-and-richrelevance-offer-1-million-
prize-to-speed-innovation-in-retail-personalization/ [https://perma.cc/2PC5-TZ8M]. 
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environment to run a contest without endangering customer privacy.
119
 
Finally, the Data for Development (D4D) Challenge encouraged 
researchers to explore international development applications using 
mobile data across a wide range of subject matters (including health, 
agriculture, transportation and urban planning, energy, and national 
statistics), while protecting the privacy of data subjects.
120
 With help 
from a team of experts at MIT, D4D released a modified set of mobile 
phone data
121
 to qualified researchers subject to a DUA imposing 
confidentiality obligations and restricting their use of the data to 
approved projects.
122
 The result was a widely praised competition with 
over sixty entries from leading academics and practitioners around the 
world and valuable research conducted with reasonable privacy 
guarantees.
123
 In short, the deidentification debate as currently conceived 
overlooks and obfuscates success stories involving improved 
regulations, new research, and improved contests and challenges that (in 
the case of D4D) both avoided past errors and achieved significant 
results. 
II. A PROCESS-BASED APPROACH TO MINIMIZE RISK 
There is another way for data release policy to advance. Instead of 
                                                     
119. See Darren Vengroff, The Inspiration Behind RecLab: Don’t Bring the Data to the Code, 
Bring the Code to the Data, RICHRELEVANCE.COM (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.richrelevance.com/ 
blog/2011/01/the-inspiration-behind-reclab-dont-bring-the-data-to-the-code-bring-the-code-to-the-
data/ [https://perma.cc/W4CV-2VDT]. On the use of synthetic data for anonymization purposes, see 
Ashwin Machanavajjhala et al., Privacy: Theory Meets Practice on the Map, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE IEEE 24TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DATA ENGINERING 277 (2008), 
http://www.cse.psu.edu/~duk17/papers/PrivacyOnTheMap.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP5N-C7LA]. 
120. See, e.g., The D4D Challenge Is a Great Success!, ORANGE, http://www.d4d.orange.com/ 
en/Accueil [https://perma.cc/SVV9-W2QQ] (last visited Apr. 24, 2016) (describing a “Data for 
Development” challenge organized by Orange (a multinational mobile operator) and Sonatel 
(Senegal’s mobile operator), with a grant from the Gates Foundation). 
121. For a description of “promising computational privacy approaches to make the re-
identification of mobile phone metadata harder,” see YVES-ALEXANDRE DE MONTJOYE ET AL., CTR. 
FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS, ENABLING HUMANITARIAN USE OF MOBILE PHONE DATA 
1, 5–6 (2014). 
122. See Conditions for the Availability of Data–Data for Development (D4D), ORANGE, 
http://www.d4d.orange.com/en/content/download/29438/273168/version/12/file/D4DSonatel_0606
2014Engl.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXF4-5TEL] (last visited Apr. 24, 2016). 
123. See ORANGE, ORANGE DATA FOR DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE IN SENEGAL, 
http://d4d.orange.com/content/download/43330/405662/version/3/file/D4Dchallenge_leaflet_A4_V
2Eweblite.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VS2-Y3ZB]. For other examples of similar projects, see Global 
Pulse, Mobile Phone Network Data for Development, LINKEDIN: SLIDESHARE (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.slideshare.net/unglobalpulse/mobile-data-for-development-primer-october-2013 
[https://perma.cc/Q86G-WS42]. 
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focusing on the ultimate goal of anonymization, the law could be 
designed around the processes necessary to lower the risk of 
reidentification and sensitive attribute disclosure. One of the reasons the 
debate about anonymization is so lively is that the concept inherently 
over-promises. To say something is anonymized is to imply a certain 
threshold of protection has been obtained. 
Think of this as a regulatory choice between output and process.
124
 
When data release policy focuses on endpoints like minimizing harm 
and avoiding actual reidentification, there are no rules about the specific 
ways in which data is protected. Output regimes sanction data security 
efforts so long as the information is made anonymous or, in more 
reasonable regimes, the resulting protection achieves a pre-specified 
threshold such as a “very small” risk that “information could be used, 
alone or in combination with other reasonably available information, by 
an anticipated recipient to identify an individual who is a subject of the 
information.”125 
While outcome-based approaches to releasing data might be good 
enough for many purposes, they are not ideal as the centerpiece for data 
release policy. As we discussed above, perfect anonymization is a myth. 
Even when more reasonable thresholds are set, scholars have shown that 
such estimates of protection are notoriously slippery given systemic 
obstacles (like the auxiliary information problem) and the number of 
variables that can effect just how well information is actually protected. 
A more sustainable approach would focus on the preconditions and 
processes necessary for protection. It is hard to ensure protection. It is 
easier, however, to ensure that data custodians follow appropriate 
processes for minimizing risk, which may include both deidentification 
in combination with legal and administrative tools, or reliance on query-
based methods like differential privacy when it is suitable for the task. 
We argue that data release policy should focus on processes, not outputs. 
Of course, there is another familiar area of information policy that 
focuses on process: data security. 
In this Part we argue that data release policy should look more like 
data security policy. We explore the additional elements data release 
policy must incorporate beyond data treatment techniques, and we list 
the components of process-based deidentification. 
                                                     
124. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309 
(2015). 
125. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1)(i) (2015).  
11 - Rubenstein & Hartzog.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2016  3:51 PM 
730 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:703 
 
A. The Poor Fit of Traditional Privacy Law for Anonymization 
The law should evolve to focus on risk and process because 
traditional goals and strategies of privacy law do not really fit the 
specific concerns related to the release of data sets. Most existing 
privacy laws focus on specific data subjects and discrete types of 
information, rather than data sets as a whole.
126
 Nor would it be a good 
idea to focus on the harms that follow poorly deidentified data. To begin 
with, harm is a contentious concept in privacy law.
127
 Many privacy 
harms are incremental or difficult to quantify and articulate. For 
example, if hackers steal your information and then sell that information 
in the black market, have you been harmed? What if you do not lose any 
money? Is your privacy violated if your personal information is used to 
create an incorrect profile of your likes and dislikes, which is used and 
sold by data brokers? These sorts of injuries often fall through the cracks 
of harm-based privacy regimes with high injury thresholds. 
Additionally, harms related to insufficient anonymization can also be 
very difficult to detect, because reidentification usually remains hidden 
unless a researcher or adversary claims credit for a successful attack. 
Attackers can thwart anonymization attempts in secret, on their own 
computers in unknown places. They can also exploit the reidentification 
of people and attributes in largely undetectable ways. Thus, harms from 
failed anonymization attempts might not come to light until many years 
after the fact, if ever. By that time, it might be impossible to tell who 
“caused” the harm in a traditional legal sense, even assuming the 
relevant harm is articulable and legally cognizable. 
Focusing solely on transparency and disclosures is also unwise. The 
failures of notice and choice regimes are well noted.
128
 Consumers only 
have a limited ability to make meaningful decisions regarding their own 
privacy due to the incredible volume, impenetrability, and 
interconnectedness of data collection and transfers.
129
 And the number of 
                                                     
126. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 6801–6809 (2012). 
127. M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1135 (2011).  
128. In a notice and choice regime, companies can engage in nearly any activity so long as a 
person has notice of the company’s actions and the choice to avoid it, such as by not using a 
particular service. See, e.g., Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at 
Proskauer on Privacy (Oct. 19, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_ 
statements/remarks-commissioner-julie-brill/101019proskauerspeech.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WRF-
4RG2]. 
129. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 1880, 1885 (2013). 
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potential additional disclosures that would be needed to address 
questionable efforts to deidentify their data would quickly overwhelm 
them. Control over information soon becomes a burden on consumers 
given the responsibility of exerting that control in seemingly unlimited 
contexts. 
The permission-based model that governs medical research under the 
heading of informed consent also presents numerous problems. In order 
to conduct medical research, companies and researchers must seek 
permission either from a regulatory body or the data subject, unless an 
exception applies. In the private sphere, companies easily extract 
consent from people, even though it is regularly meaningless.
130
 While 
consent might have an important role to play in data release policy, it 
should not be over-leveraged. 
Yet blanket and robust prohibitions on information collection and 
disclosure would be incredibly costly to organizations and society as a 
whole. Shutting down research and the information economy would be 
devastating. Even if such restrictions were wise and politically palatable, 
they would likely be ineffective given the existing data ecosystem. 
In short, approaches that focus on transparency, disclosures, harm, 
and permission all seem inadequate, at least by themselves, to respond to 
the failure of anonymization. Traditional privacy law focuses too much 
on individuals and the nature of the information collected, used, or 
disclosed. Nor are ex post, individualized remedies very effective when 
specific harms can be hard to articulate or even locate. Instead, process 
and risk can guide the best path forward. 
B. Data Release Policy Should Look Like Data Security 
Data security law involves the protection of privacy, yet it is 
analytically distinct from traditional privacy concerns in several different 
ways. As Derek Bambauer has argued, “[w]hile legal scholars tend to 
conflate privacy and security, they are distinct concerns. Privacy 
establishes a normative framework for deciding who should legitimately 
have the capability to access and alter information. Security implements 
those choices.”131 According to Bambauer, security comprises “the set of 
technological mechanisms (including, at times, physical ones) that 
mediates requests for access or control.”132 Data security policy 
                                                     
130. Id. at 1894.  
131. Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667, 668–69 
(2013). 
132. Id. at 669. 
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addresses the selection and implementation of those mechanisms by 
determining who is able to “access, use, and alter data. When security 
settings permit an actor without a legitimate claim to data to engage in 
one of these activities, we do not view that fact as altering the normative 
calculus. The actor’s moral claim does not change. The access or use is 
simply error.”133 
Applying a process-based data security approach to deidentification 
would be appropriate, even though deidentification is more often 
discussed as a privacy problem. The concept of an attacker is deployed 
in both data security and deidentification fields and many technologists 
already consider deidentification a data security issue.
134
 
A process-based data security approach has a number of advantages 
over traditional privacy-related output-based approaches. For one, those 
who attempt to violate security have fewer ethical claims than many who 
are accused of violating more nebulous notions of privacy. Data security 
breaches and reidentifications lack the justifications often supplied for 
activities like surveillance and ad targeting. As Bambauer observed, 
“security failures generally leave everyone involved (except for the 
attacker) worse off.”135 Of course, security concerns also involve 
competing considerations like cost and usability. But this calculus is 
typically incorporated into applicable “reasonableness” standards 
common in data security policy and practice. 
Data releases straddle both privacy and data security worlds. In many 
ways it can be difficult to distinguish the privacy and security issues at 
play. Consider two scenarios. First, Alpha Research Institute plans to 
release data, worries about confidentiality of sensitive records, relies 
solely on deidentification methods, which fail, resulting in individuals 
being harmed because their reidentified data sets have been accessed by 
those without authorization. Second, Beta Research Institute holds 
similar data, which is hacked via an elevation of privilege attack. Beta 
failed to encrypt its data, resulting in disclosure. Setting aside questions 
                                                     
133. Id. at 676. 
134. NIST REPORT, supra note 10, at 9 (“The term ‘attack’ is borrowed from the literature of 
computer security . . . .”); cf. Stuart S. Shapiro, Separating the Baby from the Bathwater: Toward a 
Generic and Practical Framework for Anonymization, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2011 IEEE 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TECHNOLOGIES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (2011) [hereinafter 
Shapiro, Separating the Baby from the Bathwater]; Stuart S. Shapiro, Situating Anonymization 
Within a Privacy Risk Model, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2012 IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS 
CONFERENCE (SYSCON) [hereinafter Shapiro, Situating Anonymization], https://www.mitre.org/ 
sites/default/files/pdf/12_0353.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7B6-RACN].  
135. Bambauer, supra note 131, at 681. Deidentification and data security are still costly, of 
course.  
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of difficulty or harm, is one a privacy incident and the other a security 
incident? 
Data release and deidentification are usually conceptualized as 
privacy issues. In a sense, of course, they are. Embarrassing and private 
information can be harmfully linked to real people through 
reidentification attacks. But, at least to the extent that data custodians 
avoid release-and-forget anonymization, we argue that data release is 
largely a data security issue insofar as it is concerned with who can 
actually access, use, and alter data. Similar issues of data integrity, 
identification of assets and risk, and the need for safeguards and 
probabilistic protections apply. Below we discuss several important 
aspects of data security and why they should be incorporated into data-
release policy. In particular, data security is process based, contextual, 
and risk tolerant. 
Process Based. At the level of policy, data security is conceived of as 
a process of continually identifying risk; minimizing data collection and 
retention; developing and implementing administrative, technical, and 
physical safeguards to protect against data breaches; and developing a 
response plan if a breach does occur.
136
 When a company fails to provide 
legally obligated reasonable data security, its culpable conduct is not in 
its failure to reach a predetermined level of protection, but rather in the 
failure to take the steps generally recognized in the industry to 
sufficiently reduce risk. 
In other words, in process-based regimes like data security, 
companies can be liable even in the absence of an actual breach because 
the law mandates procedures, not outputs.
137
 The actual harm is relevant 
only insofar as it gives clues as to which procedures might not have been 
properly implemented. 
Compare this to output-based regimes focused on safety and harm. 
Under tort law, people are generally free to act as recklessly as they 
want, so long as they do not harm anyone. The failure of tort law in 
cases of data breaches demonstrates this point. Claims against 
companies for negligent data security practices usually fail unless the 
                                                     
136. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a) (2015); Press Release, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Commission Statement Marking the FTC’s 50th Data Security Settlement (Jan. 31, 
2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140131gmrstatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
FGB8-JB4K].  
137. See Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data 
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230 (2015); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC 
and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014) [hereinafter Solove & 
Hartzog, Common Law of Privacy]. 
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plaintiff can demonstrate actual individualized harm, such as financial 
loss.
138
 Things like uncertainty, anxiety, or increased risk of identity 
theft shared across large numbers of people that are significant in the 
aggregate but small for each affected individual are usually not 
recognized as sufficient to clear the harm threshold. 
Process-based regimes are also more suitable than output-based 
regimes when parties have custodian-like responsibilities to protect 
people from others rather than responsibilities to keep from directly 
harming others. Tort law is largely based upon the concept that a party 
should not directly harm another party. Data security is based upon the 
idea that parties should take steps to protect those who have entrusted 
them with data. In other words, data security regimes do not have to 
wrestle with the same kinds of causation issues demanded in output-
based regimes like tort law. Process failures or violation of 
reasonableness standards are treated as culpable behavior regardless of 
the actions of others. 
Data releases fit better into a data security model than a tort law 
model. The party releasing a data set should be responsible for 
protecting people through adequate deidentification procedures, in 
combination with restrictions on access or use, or reliance on query-
based methods where appropriate. Of course, those who engage in 
reidentification are also culpable. However, they are often much more 
difficult to locate and direct causation is not always clear. When many 
data sets are combined through linkage attacks to reidentify a person, it 
is difficult to apportion comparative fault. Focusing on process helps 
avoid such intractable analyses. 
Contextual. Data security and related policy is contextually sensitive. 
FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez has stated that, “[t]he level of security 
required [by a company] depends on the sensitivity of the data, the size 
and nature of a company’s business operations, and the types of risks a 
company faces.”139 
                                                     
138. See, e.g., Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding no harm from 
increased risk of identity theft); Holmes v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 5:08-CV-00205-R, 2012 
WL 2873892, at *13 (W.D. Ky. July 12, 2012) (rejecting theory of harm for time and efforts 
expended to deal with breach); Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (E.D. 
Mo. 2009) (rejecting standing for increased risk of identity theft); McLoughlin v. People’s United 
Bank, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00944(VLB), 2009 WL 2843269, at *3–4 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009) 
(rejecting theory of harm of loss of benefit of the bargain); Bell v. Acxiom Corp., No. 
4:06CCV004850WRW, 2006 WL 2850042, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006) (rejecting theory of harm 
for increased risk of junk mail).  
139. Discussion Draft of H.R. __, A Bill to Require Greater Protection for Sensitive Consumer 
Data and Timely Notification in Case of Breach: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and 
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Data release policy should be similarly dependent upon context, 
because sound deidentification is similarly contingent upon a large 
number of factors. These include different motivations for attacks,
140
 
different approaches for computing reidentification risk,
141
 the different 
standards that have been used to describe the abilities of the 
“attacker,”142 the variety of harms that can result from the use or 
distribution of deidentified data,
143
 the effort that the organization can 
spend performing and testing the deidentification process, the utility 
desired for the deidentified data, the ability to use other controls that can 
minimize risk, the likelihood that an attacker will attempt to reidentify 
the data, and amount of effort the attacker might be willing to expend.
144
 
Wu noted that another contextually dependent deidentification 
variable is the extent to which probabilistic knowledge should be treated 
as a privacy violation and reidentification.
145
 In other words, if an 
attacker is fifty-one percent sure that a record is pointing to a particular 
person, has that person been reidentified? What if an attacker can 
determine there is a ninety percent chance of reidentification?
146
 The 
answer surely depends upon the variables mentioned above, including 
the number of people subject to reidentification, possible harms of 
reidentification, and motivation of the attacker. 
                                                     
Commerce, Subcomm. on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, 112th Cong. 42, 50 (June 15, 
2011) (statement of Edith Ramirez, Fed. Trade Comm’n).  
140. NIST REPORT, supra note 10, at 10; see also INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE, ANONYMISATION: 
MANAGING DATA PROTECTION RISK CODE OF PRACTICE (2012) [hereinafter ICO CODE], 
https://ico.org.uk/media/1061/anonymisation-code.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RDM-RWQ2]. A novel 
contribution of the ICO Code is its “motivated intruder” test, which is proposed as a default position 
for assessing risk of reidentification subject to modification according to context. ICO CODE, supra, 
at 22. The ICO noted:  
The “motivated intruder” test is useful because it sets the bar for the risk of identification 
higher than considering whether a “relatively inexpert” member of the public can achieve re-
identification, but lower than considering whether someone with access to a great deal of 
specialist expertise, analytical power or prior knowledge could do so.  
Id. at 23. 
141. ICO CODE, supra note 140, at 23. 
142. Id.  
143. NIST REPORT, supra note 10, at 9–14 (the variety of harms might include incomplete 
deidentification, identity disclosure, inferential disclosure, association harms, group harms, and 
unmasking).  
144. Id. at 13–14; cf. IOM STUDY, supra note 10. 
145. Wu, supra note 10, at 1164. 
146. Wu noted, “[t]he law tends to treat 51 percent as a magical number, or to use some other 
generally applicable threshold of significance. What matters with respect to privacy, however, is 
what effect uncertain information has, and the effect of a particular numerical level of certainty can 
vary widely across contexts.” Id. (citations omitted). 
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All of these factors mean that a “one size fits all” standard for data 
release policy will not be effective. Such attempts are doomed to be 
either over-protective or under-protective. Data security policymakers 
face a similar reality. Critics of data security policy in the United States 
often claim they need something akin to a checklist of clearly defined 
rules that set out in explicit detail the steps a company must take to be 
compliant with the law.
147
 
But like deidentification, there are too many factors to provide a 
consistent and detailed checklist for required data security practices. 
Instead, the FTC and other regulatory agencies have required 
“reasonable” data security, which is informed by industry standards.148 A 
reasonableness approach maximizes the contextual sensitivity of a 
regulatory regime. Reasonableness is an established concept employed 
in a number of different contexts, including contracts, Fourth 
Amendment law, tort law, and others.
149
 Because the field of 
deidentification advances so quickly and a determination of the risk of 
identification involves so many factors, deidentification policy should be 
contextually sensitive in a way similar to data security policy. 
Risk Tolerant. The field of data security has long acknowledged that 
there is no such thing as perfect security.
150
 As Bambauer has argued, 
“[s]cholars should cast out the myth of perfection, as Lucifer was cast 
out of heaven. In its place, we should adopt the more realistic, and 
helpful, conclusion that often good enough is . . . good enough.”151 




                                                     
147. See generally Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and 
Data Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673 
(2013). 
148. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 136.  
149. LabMD, Inc., 159 F.T.C. 2145 (Jan. 16, 2014) (interlocutory order); Woodrow Hartzog & 
Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230 
(2015).  
150. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, The Myth of Perfection, 2 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 22 
(2012), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/2012/04/the-myth-of-perfection/ [https://perma.cc/9DKN-
T2JS]; COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP, RESPONDING TO A DATA SECURITY BREACH (2014), 
http://www.cov.com/files/FirmService/f47dd97b-0481-4692-a3bf-36039593171f/Presentation/ 
ceFirmServiceDocument2/Responding_to_a_Data_Security_Breach.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L3B-
WW9L]; Leo Notenboom, Security: It’s a Spectrum, Not a State, ASKLEO (Sept. 6, 2014), 
https://askleo.com/security-its-a-spectrum-not-a-state/ [https://perma.cc/4LKC-STWY]; Bruce 
Schneier, Lessons from the Sony Hack, SCHNEIER.COM (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.schneier.com/ 
blog/archives/2014/12/lessons_from_th_4.html [https://perma.cc/Z4YG-B2UE].  
151. Bambauer, supra note 150.  
152. Ohm, supra note 2; Wu, supra note 10; Yakowitz, supra note 6.  
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A risk tolerant approach to releasing data will help move us past the 
debate over the perfection (or lack thereof) of anonymization.
153
 Because 
process-based regimes like the current U.S. approach to data security are 
agnostic about ex post harms in favor of ex ante controls, they implicitly 
accept that a certain number of harms will slip through the cracks.
154
 By 
focusing on process instead of output, data release policy can aim to 
raise the cost of reidentification and sensitive attribute disclosure to 
acceptable levels without having to ensure perfect anonymization. We 
explore what a nuanced, process-based data release policy might look 
like in Part III. 
C. Data Release Policy Must Be More Than Deidentification 
As discussed, much of the debate surrounding anonymization is 
focused on the technical means for transforming data or, more narrowly, 
deidentification.
155
 NIST acknowledged the importance of data controls 
such as contracts prohibiting reidentification, but it explicitly described 
these controls as separate from the process of deidentification.
156
 NIH is 
among the few federal agencies to rely on a tiered access approach that 
combines technical measures and data controls. 
We argue that the data controls are just as important as 
deidentification in safely releasing useful data sets. In order to bridge the 
previously mentioned divide between technology and policy, we 
recommend including both deidentification techniques and controls on 
data flow as part of data release policy as well as query-based methods 
where appropriate. While this rhetorical move might seem slight, we 
take the more inclusive approach in order to better emphasize the 
importance of a holistic approach to releasing data. This holistic 
approach would include not just data flow controls but also 
organizational structure, education, and more careful deidentification 
rhetoric. 
 Sound data release policy requires an approach that utilizes the full 
                                                     
153. See Shapiro, Separating the Baby from the Bathwater, supra note 134; Shapiro, Situating 
Anonymization, supra note 134. 
154. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 67 (2006) (noting that internet law “need not be completely effective to be 
adequately effective. All the law aims to do is to raise the costs of the activity in order to limit that 
activity to acceptable levels” (emphasis in original)). 
155. See supra Section I.A and text accompanying notes 10–12 (discussing various techniques for 
altering quasi-identifiers).  
156. NIST REPORT, supra note 10, at 1.  
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spectrum of SDL techniques—direct access, dissemination-based access, 
and query-based access. Some techniques may be best suited for 
particular contexts or best used in combination with other techniques. 
There is a growing consensus among scholars in the deidentification 
debate that access controls are critical.
157
 Yianni Lagos and Jules 
Polonetsky proposed that administrative safeguards like contracts can be 
leveraged for a “reasonably good de-identification standard” as opposed 
to “extremely strict de-identification measures,” a viewpoint aligned 
with others in the field.
158
 A few policymakers have even recognized the 
importance of data controls in shaping deidentification policy. As noted 
above, the FTC outlined what constituted “reasonably linkable” data that 
triggers privacy and data security obligations from companies.
159
 
The FTC’s approach to deidentification is promising. We join the 
                                                     
157. Ohm has endorsed regulations grounded in trust that facilitate data access to qualified 
investigators. Ohm, supra note 2, at 1767–68 (“Regulators should try to craft mechanisms for 
instilling or building upon trust in people or institutions . . . . We might, for example, conclude that 
we trust academic researchers implicitly, government data miners less, and third-party advertisers 
not at all, and we can build these conclusions into law and regulation.”). Narayanan and Felten have 
emphasized the need for a diverse toolkit for deidentification, including contracts limiting 
reidentification. NARAYANAN & FELTEN, supra note 45, at 8 (“Data custodians face a choice 
between roughly three alternatives: sticking with the old habit of de-identification and hoping for 
the best; turning to emerging technologies like differential privacy that involve some trade-offs in 
utility and convenience; and using legal agreements to limit the flow and use of sensitive data.”). 
Barth-Jones has also endorsed the contractual approach as part of deidentification policy. See, e.g., 
Barth-Jones, supra note 21.  
158. Yianni Lagos & Jules Polonetsky, Public vs. Nonpublic Data: The Benefits of Administrative 
Controls, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 103, 104 (2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/ 
default/files/online/topics/66_StanLRevOnline_103_LagosPolonetsky.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX4F-
YZ6N]. Omer Tene and Christopher Wolf asserted in a white paper for the Future of Privacy Forum 
that administrative safeguards and legal controls were critical in defining what constitutes “personal 
data.” OMER TENE & CHRISTOPHER WOLF, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, THE DEFINITION OF 
PERSONAL DATA: SEEING THE COMPLETE SPECTRUM (2013), http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-
content/uploads/FINAL-Future-of-Privacy-Forum-White-Paper-on-De-Id-January-201311.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/E6JB-HCX9]. Deven McGraw has proposed the use of data controls to make 
individuals and entities accountable for unauthorized reidentification. Deven McGraw, Building 
Public Trust in Uses of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 20 J. AM. MED. 
INFORMATICS ASS’N 29, 31 (2013) (“Accountability for unauthorized re-identification can be 
accomplished in the following two ways: (1) through legislation prohibiting recipients of de-
identified data from unauthorized re-identification of the information; and (2) by requiring HIPAA-
covered entities (and business associates) to obtain agreements with recipients of de-identified data 
that prohibit the information from being re-identified without authorization.”). Peter Swire has 
asserted that organizational controls such as data separation within organizations and contractual 
prohibitions on reidentification are crucial but underappreciated aspects of deidentification. Peter 
Swire, Comments to the FCC on Broadband Consumer Privacy (Apr. 28, 2015), 
https://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/outreach/FCC-testimony-CPNI-broadband.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E5XA-4SK6]. 
159. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, at iv, 20–21.  
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growing chorus of voices calling for an increased focus on data controls 
in the deidentification debate.
160
 But rather than commit to one particular 
data control, such as contracts, qualified investigators, or enclaves, we 
argue that the full range of control options should be utilized in 
conjunction with data treatment techniques, organizational support, and 
mindful framing to establish a sound deidentification regime. 
But if risk, access, and control are to become central in data release 
policy, then a harsh truth is revealed: many kinds of public releases of 
data must be curtailed. It is much more difficult to assess the risk of 
reidentification when those who share data lose control over it. There are 
simply too many factors that cannot be accounted for or even reliably 
estimated. Therefore, we argue that sound process-based policy 
minimizes or eliminates “release-and-forget” deidentification as an 
acceptable strategy. At the very least, the data release process should 
require DUAs from data recipients promising to refrain from 
reidentification, to keep an audit trail, and to perpetuate deidentification 
protections. 
Of course, the release-and-forget model has its advantages, but with 
respect to deidentified data, the benefits of being free from data controls 
do not outweigh the cost of relinquishing control and protection. To 
begin with, release-and-forget deidentification fuels the paranoia 
surrounding anonymization. The best-known reidentification attacks all 
involve release-and-forget data sets. 
Additionally, if properly drafted and executed, DUAs should not be 
overly burdensome for data recipients. Contracts are ubiquitous. 
Consumers and organizations enter into tens if not hundreds of complex, 
less-justifiable contracts every week in the form of End User License 
Agreements (EULAs), terms of service, and other standard-form 
contracts, to say nothing of the contemplated, bargained-for contracts for 
negotiated goods and services. 
By contrast, DUAs governing the release of deidentified data can be 
workable. Privacy researcher Robert Gellman suggested that data 
recipients should agree not to attempt reidentification, take reasonable 
steps to keep related parties from reidentifying data, and keep potentially 
identifiable data confidential unless the recipient agrees to the same 
reidentification restrictions.
161
 These terms represent a holistic approach 
                                                     
160. See supra Sections I.A.3–.4. 
161. Robert Gellman, The Deidentification Dilemma: A Legislative and Contractual Proposal, 21 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 33, 51–52 (2010). Gellman also suggested that data 
recipients implement reasonable administrative, technical, and physical data safeguards and be 
transparent to others regarding all such data agreements the recipient is subject to. Id. 
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designed to mitigate the failures of technical deidentification through 
data treatment. Likewise, they reflect a “chain-link” data protection 
approach by imposing substantive protections, requiring that future 
recipients of data be similarly vetted and bound, and that the contractual 
chain will be perpetuated.
162
 In addition, terms regarding record keeping, 
audit trails, and other transparency mechanisms could be added to ensure 
compliance.
163
 Yakowitz suggested that obligations on the data recipient 
not to engage in reidentification could be backed by criminal penalties 
for violations.
164
 Of course, any such statutory prohibition would need 




But not every data use agreement need be equally robust. As 
previously mentioned, we envision an inverse ratio relationship between 
data treatment and data controls, whereby technical and legal controls 
can be adjusted according to context. Yet some form of data control 
seems necessary in most situations. Even many presumptively “open” 
data sets require assent to terms of use agreements.
166
 
We envision deidentification policy that adopts a sort of inverse-ratio 
rule for data treatment and data controls. Controlling for other factors, 
the more rigorous and robust the data treatment, the less potent the data 
controls need to be. The more protective data controls become, the less 
thorough data treatment needs to be.
167
 
Because sound deidentification is dependent upon many factors, 
companies should be allowed some flexibility in choosing which data 
controls are reasonable in a given context. However, as we will describe 
below, some data controls, like contractual prohibitions on 
reidentification, might be indispensable in all but the most benign 
circumstances. 
                                                     
162. See Woodrow Hartzog, Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L. REV. 657, 659, 660–61 (2012) 
(advocating a “chain-link confidentiality” approach to protecting online privacy).  
163. See supra note 82. 
164. See supra note 82. 
165. Gellman, supra note 161. Gellman’s model bill would make it a felony to engage in 
“knowing and willful reidentification or attempted reidentification” and a major felony with the 
possibility of imprisonment where there is “intent to sell, transfer, or use personal information for 
commercial advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm.” Id. at 53. Yakowitz also advocated 
criminalizing attempts at reidentification but only when “an adversary discloses the identity and a 
piece of non-public information to one other person who is not the data producer.” Yakowitz, supra 
note 6, at 48–49. This approach seeks to avoid “unintentionally criminalizing disclosure-risk 
research.” Id. 
166. See, e.g., The D4D Challenge Is a Great Success!, supra note 120.  
167. See IOM STUDY, supra note 10. 
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D. Seven Risk Factors 
Perhaps the best way to build upon the FTC’s framework is to 
identify the different risk vectors to be balanced in determining how 
protective a company must be when releasing a data set. There are at 
least seven variables to consider, many of which have been identified in 




Volume of Data: The FTC’s approach does not discriminate based 
upon the nature of the data. But the volume of the data can affect the risk 
of reidentification and sensitive attribute disclosure. Some large data sets 





Sensitivity of the Data: Some information, like health and financial 
information, is more sensitive and thus more likely to be targeted by 
attackers. As Ohm argues in a recent paper, sensitive information is 
important because it is strongly connected to privacy harms affecting 
individuals.
170
 It also lends itself to a threat modeling approach for 




Recipient of the Data: There are at least three different types of 
recipients of data, each increasingly risky: (1) internal recipients, 
(2) trusted recipients, and (3) the general public. Internal recipients are 
in most respects the least problematic, though how “internal” is 
conceptualized is important. Trusted recipients are riskier, but should be 
an integral part of any data release policy. De Montjoye and his 
colleagues have argued that data sharing regimes should facilitate more 
sharing among trusted data recipients “with strong processes, data 
security, audit, and access control mechanisms in place. For example, 
trusted third parties at research universities might warrant access to 
richer, less anonymized data for research purposes and be relied on not 
to try to re-identify individuals or to use the data inappropriately.”172 
There might exist several tiers of trusted recipients, with increasing 
protections tied to less-trustworthy recipients. Data sharing with 
                                                     
168. See ICO CODE, supra note 140; supra note 10. 
169. See de Montjoye et al., supra note 40. 
170. See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1125–28 (2015). 
171. Id. 
172. DE MONTJOYE ET AL., supra note 121, at 4–5.  
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recipients at the lowest tier would be treated as the equivalent of public 
release. Finally, as we discuss below, public releases should be seen as 
inherently problematic and require the greatest amount of protections, all 
other variables being equal. 
One way to assign organizations to these categories is by evaluating 
their privacy programs. Does the organization collect and store data in a 
way that minimizes the risk of reidentification and sensitive attribute 
disclosure? Does it offer privacy training to its employees, segment the 
virtual and physical storage of data, implement company policies 
regarding deidentification, and set a tone within the organization 
regarding data minimization and anonymization as important privacy 
protections? 
These structures are crucial not only to ensure that data treatment 
techniques and controls are consistently and correctly executed, but also 
to protect against the insider threat to deidentified data. Wu drew a 
distinction between “insider” or “outsider” threats. He wrote that 
“[p]rivacy ‘insiders’ are those whose relationship to a particular 
individual allows them to know significantly more about that individual 
than the general public does. Family and friends are examples.”173 Wu 
noted that co-workers and service providers at the corporate and 
employee levels could also be insiders, “for example, employees at a 
communications service provider, or workers at a health care facility.”174 
Insider attacks present a range of different problems for deidentification. 
Wu noted, “[i]n security threat modeling, analysts regard insider attacks 
as ‘exceedingly difficult to counter,’ in part because of the ‘trust 
relationship . . . that genuine insiders have.’”175 
 
Use of the Data: Some uses of data are riskier, less necessary, or 
more problematic than others. Will the data be used for routine, 
administrative purposes like record keeping, website development, or 
customer service? Or will it be used for commercial or discriminatory 
purposes? Will certain uses of data create a motivation for attackers to 
attempt reidentification? Information that is to be used for more 
problematic purposes likely must be better protected given the potential 
harm and motivations by attackers to identify people or sensitive 
attributes. Some have also argued that protections should be lowered if 
                                                     
173. Wu, supra note 10, at 1154.  
174. Id. 
175. Id. (quoting SUSAN LANDAU, SURVEILLANCE OR SECURITY?: THE RISKS POSED BY NEW 
WIRETAPPING TECHNOLOGIES 162–63 (2010)). 
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Data Treatment Techniques: Risk varies according to the ways data 
is manipulated through the use of deidentification and SDL techniques to 
protect data subjects. Data values are suppressed, generalized, 
substituted, diluted with noise, and hashed to protect identities and 
sensitive attributes.
177
 Sometimes entirely new data sets that do not map 
to actual individuals are synthetically created as safer surrogates than 
authentic data. Query-based systems provide another form of treatment, 
whereby only parts of a database are made available to recipients in 
response to specific queries. Such controls can leverage techniques like 
differential privacy to protect the identity and attributes of users. 
 
Data Access Controls: Risk is also contingent upon the way data is 
released. When SDL and other access controls are utilized to limit who 
can access data and how they can access it, this lowers the risk of 
reidentification or sensitive data disclosure. Companies can choose to 
release data only to internal staff or trusted recipients, provided they 
contractually agree to protect the data and refrain from attempting 
reidentification. Recipient controls can be combined with distribution 
controls. Furthermore, they can make data available only via on-site 
terminals or secure portals. 
 
Data Subject’s Consent or Expectations: People are told that their 
data is often collected only for specific purposes. These representations 
are made in permission forms, privacy policies, marketing materials, 
orally, and as part of an app or website’s design. Meaningful, properly 
obtained consent can mitigate the need to offer robust protections. Also, 
as we discuss below, in order to avoid being deceptive, protections 
should meet or exceed consumer expectations created by a company’s 
statements or omissions. 
E. Data Release Policy Should Embrace Industry Standards 
In order to be effective and sustainable, data release policy must be 
nimble, which in turn requires a relative lack of specificity. The more 
                                                     
176. DE MONTJOYE ET AL., supra note 121, at 4 (“Special consideration should be given to cases 
where the data will be used for significant public good or to avoid serious harm to people.”).  
177. See NIST REPORT, supra note 10. 
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detailed data release law becomes, the quicker it becomes outdated. 
Laws are difficult to amend. The better alternative to regulatory 
specificity is to tether obligations of reasonable conduct to industry 
standards. 
Industry standards are attractive for regulatory purposes because they 
are regularly updated. They are also, by definition, feasible and have the 
support of an industry’s majority. The key to data security law in the 
U.S. is a reasonable adherence to industry standards.
178
 This approach 
has kept data security standards fluid, negotiable based upon context and 
resources, and ascertainable to those responsible for securing data. 
Rather than looking to the law for specific data security practices to 
follow, data security professionals look to state-of-the-art standards from 




This approach provides a good deal of breathing space to 
organizations where it is difficult to prescribe with precision the optimal 
protections in a given context. It also helps ensure that rules surrounding 
such a highly technical field as data security remain grounded in reality 
and up-to-date. For example, Vadhan and his colleagues have proposed 
that regulatory agencies maintain a safe harbor list of data-sharing 
mechanisms appropriate for different contexts that can be maintained 
and regularly updated with the input of experts and stakeholders.
180
 
Deferring to industry standards is not without risk. Certain minimal 
protections for people must be ensured. Simply because a practice is 
standard does not ensure that it is sufficient. Thus, regulators must 
ensure a co-regulatory approach (like Vadhan’s or otherwise) that helps 
shape minimum industry standards and steps in when industry standards 
                                                     
178. See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 149; Kristina Rozan, How Do Industry Standards for 
Data Security Match Up with the FTC’s Implied “Reasonable” Standards—and What Might This 
Mean for Liability Avoidance?, PRIVACY ADVISOR (Nov. 25, 2014), https://privacyassociation.org/ 
news/a/how-do-industry-standards-for-data-security-match-up-with-the-ftcs-implied-reasonable-
standards-and-what-might-this-mean-for-liability-avoidance/ [https://perma.cc/YW6L-BKWB].  
179. See supra note 177. 
180. Vadhan et al., supra note 70. In particular, they propose that each entry in this list would:  
[S]pecify a class of data sources (e.g. electronic health records that do not include any genomic 
data), a class of data-sharing methods (e.g. HIPAA-style de-identification by the removal of 
certain fields, or interactive mechanisms that achieve a given level of differential privacy), a 
class of informed consent mechanisms, and a class of potential recipients. Together, these 
components of an entry specify a set of contexts in which a safe harbor would apply, and case-
by-case IRB [Institutional Review Board] review could be avoided. In the long term, one can 
hope for this list to be sufficiently comprehensive so that the vast majority of research projects 
can proceed without IRB review of informational harms.  
Id. at 7. We believe this proposal has much merit.  
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fail to deliver that minimum standard of care. Yet, generally speaking, 
deference to industry standards has proven workable if not fruitful in the 
field of data security.
181
 
Data release policy should also be tethered to international data 
security standards, some of which already address deidentification and 
data release. There are at least five popular data security standards that 
have helped shaped policy, two of which (NIST 800-53
182
 and ISO 
27001
183
) enjoy widespread support.
184
 There is substantial overlap 
between these standards as well.
185
 
Some of these standards have begun to address deidentification and 
data release, though their guidance needs to become more specific. 
Appendix J of the popular NIST 800-53 standard simply identifies 
anonymization and deidentification as techniques that support the fair 
information principle of data minimization.
186
 Even the specific 
publication on protecting the confidentiality on PII only includes a small 
Section on deidentifying and anonymizing information that provides 
little guidance to companies.
187
 
Yet industry and international standards are on their way, as 
demonstrated by the NIST Draft Report and the UK’s Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) report.188 If developed correctly, standards 
will bring with them both a common vocabulary and consensus on 
process. Even though the NIST Draft Report has yet to offer advice on 
proper process, it is a remarkably concise and useful summary of the 
problem and articulation of common terms. 
There are a number of other possible standards that could set the bar 
for deidentification policy. For example, the Article 29 Data Protection 
                                                     
181. Id.  
182. KELLEY DEMPSEY ET AL., NIST COMPUT. SEC. DIV., SUMMARY OF NIST SP 800-53 
REVISION 4, SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND 
ORGANIZATIONS (2014), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-53-rev4/sp800-53r4_ 
summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM6F-J23U]. 
183. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO/IEC 27001:2013 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY—
SECURITY TECHNIQUES—INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS—REQUIREMENTS 
(2013), http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=54534 [https://perma.cc/5BYD-LL4Y].  
184. Rozan, supra note 178. 
185. Id.  
186. DEMPSEY ET AL., supra note 182, at J-2, J-14.  
187. ERIKA MCCALLISTER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., GUIDE TO PROTECTING 
THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 4-3, 4-4 (2010), 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-122/sp800-122.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QWW-2TW6].  
188. See ICO CODE, supra note 140. 
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Working Party recently published an opinion laying out the strengths 
and weaknesses of the main anonymization techniques as well as the 
common mistakes related to their use.
189
 While this opinion offers much 
useful guidance, it never quite resolves a tension in European data 
protection law between the legal implications of anonymization
190
 and a 




Some of the most promising guidance capable of being standardized 
by industry is a 2012 anonymization code of practice issued by the 
United Kingdom’s ICO.192 The ICO Code is focused on identifying risks 
when anonymizing information and articulating specific practices to 
minimize them. Most importantly, the Code is risk tolerant and focused 
on process rather than output.
193
 Thus, notwithstanding its use of the 
term anonymization, it is a good candidate for policymakers to borrow 
from when creating a process-based deidentification policy.  
*     *     * 
In this Part, we have outlined the three core aspects of a process-
based approach to mitigating the risk of releasing data. Borrowing from 
data security, data release policy should be broader than just 
deidentification techniques. It should also incorporate SDL techniques 
like query-based access and other data controls to protect against many 
different kinds of threats. Finally, by fostering and relying upon industry 
standards similar to data security policy, data release policy can become 
                                                     
189. See Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques by the Working Party on the Protection 
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 0829/14/EN, WP 216 [hereinafter 
Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/ 
documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp216_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C46F-3GV9]. 
190. For example, Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, supra note 189, states that “principles 
of protection shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no 
longer identifiable,” which amounts to a perfect anonymization requirement. Id. at 5 (quoting 
Council Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 26, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 31 (EC) [hereinafter Directive 
95/46/EC]). 
191. In contrast, Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 190, states that account should be taken of all the 
“means likely reasonably to be used” to identify a person. Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, 
supra note 189. Although the Working Party struggles to split the difference between these two 
competing conceptions, it achieves limited success. See id. at 8 (referring to an earlier opinion in 
which it “clarified that the ‘means . . . reasonably to be used’ test is suggested by the Directive as a 
criterion to be applied in order to assess whether the anonymisation process is sufficiently robust, 
i.e. whether identification has become ‘reasonably’ impossible”). But “reasonably impossible” is 
clearly a self-contradictory notion. 
192. See ICO CODE, supra note 140. 
193. The report avoids absolute framing and instead focuses on language like “mitigating,” not 
eliminating, risk. Id. at 18.  
11 - Rubenstein & Hartzog.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2016  3:51 PM 
2016] ANONYMIZATION AND RISK 747 
 
more specific, flexible, and tethered to reality and the state of the art. In 
the next Part, we will discuss how process-based data release policy 
might work in practice. 
III. IMPLEMENTING PROCESS-BASED DATA RELEASE 
POLICY 
Let us recap what we have covered so far. In Part I, we reviewed the 
anonymization debate and stagnant policy. In Part II, we proposed that 
data release policy should be focused on the process of minimizing risk. 
Drawing from data security law, we developed a process-based data 
release policy as a holistic, contextual and risk tolerant approach. In this 
Part, we propose several legal reforms to safely release data. 
Data release policy is not hopelessly broken. It regularly works quite 
well. However, many current laws and policies should be updated given 
the uncertainty surrounding reidentification and sensitive attribute risk. 
Policymakers could incorporate process-based data release rules without 
dramatic upheaval to relevant privacy regimes. Process-based data 
release can be implemented in increments and serve as an additional 
protective strategy as well as a replacement to output-based regimes in 
some contexts. In this Part, we review a few areas where the law could 
be changed to focus more on process rather than output or use more 
accurate rhetoric to better shape expectations. 
A. From Output to Process 
There are a number of deidentificaiton and data release laws that 
depend on outputs related to the data itself. For example, common 
conceptualizations of PII hinge upon whether an individual is or can be 
ultimately identified from a data set.
194
 The EU Data Protection 
Directive includes personal data within its scope on similar grounds and 
excludes “data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject 
is no longer identifiable.”195 The HIPAA deidentification regime turns 
on whether data lacks certain attributes or whether an expert finds a 
threshold level of risk has been crossed with respect to the data set. 
These regimes could be modified to focus on ensuring a process to 
protect information was followed, rather than looking to the state of the 
data itself. Like data security law, HIPAA could simply require the 
                                                     
194. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of 
Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1828–36 (2011). 
195. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 190.  
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implementation of “reasonable data release protections.” 
What does this mean? Again, the best place to turn for guidance is the 
law of data security. The FTC requires that companies collecting 
personal information provide “reasonable data security.”196 A 
combination of the FTC’s complaints, its statement issued in 
conjunction with its fiftieth data security complaint, and a guide on data 
security reveals that there are four major components of “reasonable data 
security”: (1) assessment of data and risk; (2) data minimization; 
(3) implementation of physical, technical, and administrative safeguards; 
and (4) development and implementation of a breach response plan.
197
 
We propose that these four tenets of reasonable data security can be 
modified to establish a general requirement that businesses provide 
“reasonable data release protections.” The tenets of reasonable process-
based data release protections would look similar to those of data 
security: 
1) Assess data to be shared and risk of disclosure; 
2) Minimize data to be released; 
3) Implement reasonable (proportional) deidentification and/or 
additional data control techniques as appropriate; 
4) Develop a monitoring, accountability, and breach response 
plan. 
These requirements would be informed by the nascent industry 
standards, including accepted deidentification and SDL techniques as 
well as a consideration of the seven risk vectors described above. This 
approach is context-sensitive and would allow companies to tailor their 
obligations to the risk. 
Notions of reasonable, process-based data release protections could 
be implemented in various privacy regimes. The HIPAA Privacy Rule 
currently outlines two paths for deidentifying health data sets, the Safe 
Harbor method and expert determinations.
198
 Both have long been 
subjects of criticism.
199
 HIPAA could move closer to process-based data 
releases in several different ways. First, the Safe Harbor method could 
be modified to require technological, organizational, and contractual 
mechanisms for limiting access to deidentified data sets as well as 
deidentification. Additionally, experts might be asked to certify 
                                                     
196. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 136. 
197. Id. The FTC added specifics to these general tenets in its guide to data security for 
businesses with ten general rules of thumb. Id. 
198. See supra note 115. 
199. See McGraw, supra note 158. 
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 rather than assess risk. Companies seeking to be certified as 
HIPAA compliant would be asked to demonstrate that they have 
implemented a comprehensive data release program analogous to the 
comprehensive privacy and security programs articulated in FTC 
consent orders.
202
 This would include performing a threat analysis, 
identifying mitigating controls, and documenting the methods and 
results of this analysis (as required by the expert determination 
method).
203
 Although these approaches have their own drawbacks,
204
 
they would better incentivize robust data release protections and mitigate 
the inherent difficulty of assessing reidentification and sensitive attribute 
disclosure risk. 
More generally and regardless of whether HIPAA applies, any 
company seeking to fortify data releases should implement procedures to 
minimize risk. Instead of mechanically removing a pre-set list of 
identifiers, threat modeling should be used to calculate risk as soundly 
and accurately as possible. These threat models would then guide 
companies toward the implementation of deidentification safeguards or 
use of other SDL methods, including direct access methods and query-
based access methods such as differential privacy. 
Using reasonable data release protections as a regulatory trigger 
would have several advantages over output-based risk thresholds. 
Companies would be incentivized to embrace the full spectrum of SDL 
methods and to combine deidentification techniques with access controls 
to protect data. Data release policy would create efficiencies by 
becoming aligned with data security law. A co-regulatory approach 
would drive the development of industry standards and safe-harbor lists, 
which would keep data release laws feasible and grounded. As discussed 
above, process-based approaches grounded in a reasonableness standard 
are nimble, contextual, and risk tolerant. Using risk analysis to inform 
process rather than ultimately determine regulatory application also 
                                                     
200. See supra note 10. 
201. See supra note 153. 
202. See, e.g., Daniel Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, Snapchat and FTC Privacy and Security 
Consent Orders, LINKEDIN (May 12, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140512053224-
2259773-the-anatomy-of-an-ftc-privacy-and-data-security-consent-order [https://perma.cc/9EL2-
LWUG]. 
203. For a related suggestion, see McGraw, supra note 158, at 32 (advocating that HHS explore 
certifying or accrediting entities that regularly deidentify data or evaluate reidentification risk). 
204. Id. (discussing the prospects for eliminating or modifying deidentification methods under the 
Privacy Rule). 
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provides some wiggle room for an inexact exercise. 
The FTC could extend data release policy to all data sets via section 5 
of the FTC Act.
205
 In addition to its proposed jurisdictional test, the 
agency could regulate unreasonably protected releases of data sets as an 
unfair trade practice. If process-based data release protection proves 
workable, it could even be used in a new baseline privacy law that 
discouraged release-and-forget anonymization, encouraged data use 




The transition to a risk-based process also begins to resolve several 
lingering problems in the contemporary anonymization debate. First, it 
mitigates Ohm’s “broken promises” objection by treating 
deidentification not as a jurisdictional test in privacy law but rather as 
one of several possible approaches to sharing data using the full gamut 
of SDL methods. As previously noted, following a risk-based approach 
relaxes certain privacy requirements but not others.
207
 It follows that no 
one has to make “breakable promises” regarding (perfect) anonymity. 
Rather, organizations will offer appropriate assurances based on 
reasonable security measures. 
Second, it suggests a possible workaround to the auxiliary 
information problem. Ohm correctly noted that solving this problem via 
regulation quickly turns into a game of “whack-a-mole.”208 While it may 
be impossible to limit auxiliary information, the use of trusted recipients 
and direct access methods to deprive most adversaries of access to 
protected data sets is much less challenging. This may seem 
cumbersome and may discourage some researchers from engaging in 
important work and yet it reflects current thinking about the costs and 
benefits of open data.
209
 
B. Deceptive Deidentification 
The way companies and the media talk about deidentified data 
matters, and data holders regularly play fast and loose with the concept 
of anonymity. The terms “anonymous” and “anonymization” simply 
over-promise. They create expectations of near-perfection and lull 
                                                     
205. It could do so either as an unfair or deceptive trade practice, depending on context. See 
Solove & Hartzog, Common Law of Privacy, supra note 137. 
206. See Gellman, supra note 161. 
207. See supra Section II.D. 
208. Ohm, supra note 2, at 1742.  
209. See supra Section I.A.4. 
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people into a false sense of security. It is no wonder that the media keep 
proclaiming the death of anonymity—we keep expecting the impossible. 
In previous work, one of us has noted: 
The resolution of a debate often hinges on how the problem 
being debated is presented. In communication, sociology, 
psychology, and related disciplines, this method of issue 
presentation is known as framing. Framing theory holds that 
even small changes in the presentation of an issue or event can 
produce significant changes of opinion. For example, people are 
more willing to tolerate rallies by controversial hate groups 
when such rallies are framed as free speech issues, rather than 
disruptions of the public order.
210
 
So it goes for the deidentification debate. In the same way that there is 
no such thing as perfect data security, there is no such thing as perfect 
deidentification. Our policy and rhetoric should reflect this fact. 
Ohm makes a similar point, suggesting that we “abolish the word 
anonymize” and replace it with a word like “scrub” that “conjures effort, 
not achievement.”211 We agree with Ohm that rhetoric is a key aspect of 
this debate, and the terms “anonymous” and “anonymization” should be 
used very sparingly and with due attention to precision. They are 
counterproductive because they create unrealistic consumer 
expectations. We view terms such as “pseudonymous” as often more 
technically accurate.
212
 However, we disagree with Ohm’s suggestion 
that we also abandon the term “deidentification,” which we find a useful 
umbrella term to incorporate data transformation as well as data 
controls. Rather than jettisoning deidentificaiton, we should clarify its 
meaning as a broad, general term referring to the process by which data 
custodians treat and control data to make it harder for users of the data 
to determine the identities of the data subjects. 
While “anonymization” has far too much baggage to be useful 
anymore, “deidentification” is a more responsible and useful way to 
refer to the process by which a data custodian uses a combination of data 
                                                     
210. Woodrow Hartzog, The Fight to Frame Privacy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (2013) 
(citing Thomas E. Nelson et al., Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on 
Tolerance, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567 (1997)). 
211. Ohm, supra note 2, at 1744.  
212. See, e.g., Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individual with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement 
of Such Data (General Data Protection), Compromise Amendments on Articles 30–91, at Arts. 33, 
81, COM (2012) 11 (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.computerundrecht.de/comp_am_art_30-91en.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/GEM8-SL2A] (distinguishing personal data from pseudonyms). 
11 - Rubenstein & Hartzog.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2016  3:51 PM 
752 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:703 
 
alteration and removal techniques and sharing and mining controls to 
make it harder or more unlikely for users of the data to determine the 
identities of the data subjects. 
In previous research, one of us has developed the concept of 
“obscurity” as the preferable way of conceptualizing notions of privacy 
in shared information.
213
 When information is obscure, that is, unlikely 
to be found or understood, it is, to a certain degree, safe. NIST correctly 
notes the efficacy of obscured, deidentified data.
214
 But even 
“anonymized” data (which NIST sees as ensuring that previously 
identified data cannot be reidentified) exists along a continuum of 
obscurity. “Anonymization” just makes it harder, but not impossible, to 
find out someone’s identity. NIST’s obscurity framing for deidentified 
data is thus the most accurate, even for “anonymized” information. 
Getting the framing for the deidentification debate right is critical to 
setting people’s expectations regarding how their data will be protected. 
If companies do not promise perfection and people do not expect it, then 
deidentification policy will be more likely to reflect reality. Risk tolerant 
rules become politically palatable and consumers can better sense the 
extent to which their disclosures make them vulnerable. 
There is great benefit to improving the accuracy of consumer 
expectations. Consider an “anonymous social network”215 app called 
Whisper, which was the subject of a series of articles by The Guardian 
in fall 2014, asserting that the app might be less than anonymous.
216
 
Whisper has sold itself as the “safest place” on the internet.217 However, 
its terms of use have evolved to tell a more realistic and less bulletproof 
                                                     
213. Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Obscurity and Privacy, in ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY (Joseph Pitt & Ashley Shew eds., forthcoming 2016); Woodrow 
Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2013); 
Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 385 (2013). 
214. See NIST REPORT, supra note 10. 
215. Whisper, GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=sh.whisper&hl=en 
[https://perma.cc/7MY7-44AT] (last visited Apr. 24, 2016).  
216. Paul Lewis & Dominic Rushe, Revealed: How Whisper App Tracks ‘Anonymous’ Users, 
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/16/-sp-revealed-
whisper-app-tracking-users [https://perma.cc/NQ6E-FGAU]. But see Corrections and Clarifications 
Column Editor, Whisper—A Clarification, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/ 
news/2015/mar/11/corrections-and-clarifications [https://perma.cc/T4LQ-8R4H].  
217. Dana Goodyear, Open Secrets, NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2014/12/08/open-secrets-5 [https://perma.cc/L2MD-KXD4]; Stephen Loeb, Heyward: 
Whisper Is “the Safest Place on the Internet,” VATORNEWS (Oct. 4, 2014), 
http://vator.tv/news/2014-10-04-heyward-whisper-is-the-safest-place-on-the-internet 
[https://perma.cc/3HT7-MKH2].  
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 At one point, Whisper’s privacy policy stated: 
We collect very little information that could be used to identify 
you personally. . . . Our goal is to provide you with a tool that 
allows you to express yourself while remaining anonymous to 
the community. However, please keep in mind that your 
whispers will be publicly viewable, so if you want to preserve 
your anonymity you should not include any personal 
information in your whispers. . . . [E]ven if you do not include 
personal information in your whispers, your use of the Services 
may still allow others, over time, to make a determination as to 
your identity based on the content of your whispers as well as 
your general location. . . . [W]e encourage you to be careful and 




Note the explicit emphasis on the fallibility of anonymity. Such accuracy 
is desirable, though it may accomplish little for consumers who do not 
and cannot be expected to read the fine print.
220
 Users are much more 
likely to read the app’s marketing description as “anonymous” and 
proceed accordingly. Such practices breed deception and confusion and 
frustrate sound deidentification policy. 
Yet the rhetoric of anonymity remains effective for one simple 
purpose: convincing people to trust data recipients with their personal 
information. To be anonymous online is to be safe. Companies that 
promise anonymity gain the benefit of people’s trust even when there is 
a notable risk of reidentification from poorly anonymized data sets. 
The FTC should continue to use its authority under section 5 of the 
FTC Act to ensure that promises of anonymity are not deceptive. Put 
simply, companies cannot guarantee anonymity. However, companies 
can promise that they have assessed the risk of harm from the use and 
release of data and have implemented appropriate protections according 
to industry standards. Tempering the language of anonymization and 
deidentification will help appropriately set consumer expectations. 
                                                     
218. Paul Lewis & Dominic Rushe, Whisper App Has Published Its New Terms of Service and 
Privacy Policy, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/16/-
sp-whisper-privacy-policy-terms-of-service [https://perma.cc/M5NR-4AYZ].  
219. Privacy Policy, WHISPER, https://whisper.sh/privacy (last visited Apr. 30, 2015) (emphasis 
added). 
220. Woodrow Hartzog, The Problems and Promise with Terms of Use as the Chaperone of the 
Social Web, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 11, 2013), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/ 
2013/06/the-problems-and-promise-with-terms-of-use-as-the-chaperone-of-the-social-web.html 
[https://perma.cc/PR84-ZWGJ].  
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Promising process rather than perfection and output will also force 
companies to actively embrace data release protections rather than 
passively benefit from speculative risk calculations. 
Truthful deidentification rhetoric can also be encouraged in ethical 
engineering principles and in business-to-business contracts and 
communications. Data release policy should focus on education efforts 
for people, companies, and, critically, the media. Like privacy, the 
rumors of deidentification’s death have been greatly exaggerated. Yet 
media coverage of successful reidentification attempts remains a critical 
component of understanding the limits of deidentification and the larger 
world of protections for the disclosure of data. A better dialogue 
between journalists, scholars, and policymakers would benefit all. 
C. Data Release Policy and PII 
As noted above, PII typically defines the scope and boundaries of 
privacy law.
221
 Although there are several different approaches to 
defining PII,
222
 the key point is that many privacy laws associate privacy 
harm with PII and leave non-PII unregulated.
223
 Thus, many 
organizations devise a compliance strategy premised on this distinction 
and take steps to transform PII into non-PII with the goal of limiting or 
eliminating their obligations under applicable privacy statutes and 
regulations. 
By now the problems associated with this deidentification strategy are 
familiar. First, a lack of relevant deidentification standards means that 
many organizations do a poor job “anonymizing” data, yet claim its 
unregulated status. Second, while deidentification reduces risk, it never 
achieves perfection. Thus, even organizations that follow best practices 
may not be wholly successful in protecting the privacy of data subjects. 
Finally, release-and-forget methods exacerbate these problems by 
creating publicly available data sets over which organizations are 
incapable of imposing controls. 
In a path-breaking article, Schwartz and Solove argue that despite 
these and other problems, privacy law should not abandon the concept of 
PII but rather develop a new model using a standards-based approach.
224
 
According to their revitalized standard, PII should be conceptualized in 
                                                     
221. See supra Section I.A.2. 
222. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 194, at 1828–36 (describing three main approaches). 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 1870–72.  
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terms of a risk-based continuum, with three categories: information that 
refers to (1) an identified person, (2) an identifiable person, and (3) a 
non-identifiable person.
225
 A person is identified when her identity is 
“ascertained” or he or she can be “distinguished” from a group; a person 
is identifiable when specific identification is “not a significantly 
probable event” (i.e., the risk is low to moderate); while non-identifiable 
information carries only a “remote” risk of identification.226 Moreover, 
Schwartz and Solove argue that the applicability of the FIPPs turns on 
these categories. Thus, while all of the FIPPs generally should apply to 
information that refers to an identified person, only some of the FIPPs—
data quality, transparency, and security (but not notice, access, and 
correction rights)—should apply to identifiable data.227 
This reconceptualization of PII complements our risk-based approach 
to deidentification as proposed above. The tripartite approach requires an 
ex ante assessment of whether a given data set should be treated as 
falling into category 1 (and accorded protection under the full FIPPs), 
category 2 (partial FIPPs apply) or category 3 (no FIPPs apply). 
According to Schwartz and Solove, this assessment must look at “the 
means likely to be used by parties with current or probable access to the 
information, as well as the additional data upon which they can draw” as 
well as additional contextual factors such as “the lifetime for which 
information is to be stored, the likelihood of future development of 
relevant technology, and parties’ incentives to link identifiable data to a 
specific person.”228 We agree. While Schwartz and Solove might be 
overly optimistic about the availability of “practical tools” for assessing 
the risk of identification,
229
 their approach—with one important 
modification—presents a clear path for overcoming the regulatory 
problems noted above. The modification is to treat public release of data 
sets as an overriding factor in assigning data sets to categories 1, 2, or 3. 
Under this modified version of PII 2.0 (call it PII 2.1), regulators 
should create a default presumption that publicly released data sets are 
identifiable, even if the data custodian deidentifies the data set by 
removing common identifiers. This presumption could be overcome by 
determining that the data custodian meets process-based data release 
                                                     
225. Id. at 1877–79. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 1879–83. The authors are silent on the remaining FIPPs.  
228. Id. at 1878. 
229. Id. at 1879. They do not factor in the auxiliary information problem or respond to criticisms 
based on the lack of mathematical rigor in assessing the risk of reidentification. Id. 
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requirements as described below. Obviously, this would require changes 
to the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 
Our proposal will operate similarly to the FTC’s deidentification 
framework, which acts as a threshold PII test as well. Recall that the 
FTC uses a “reasonable linkability” standard for determining the scope 
of its privacy framework.
230
 While “reasonable linkability” seems 
output-based, it is mainly a process requirement. Obtain contracts, 
promise to protect the data, and scrub the data to a sufficient degree, and 
the information is excluded from the framework. While the scrubbing of 
data is output-based, it need not be. Our proposal for process-based data 
release policy could be similarly repurposed, such that proper data 
release protections meeting a reasonableness standard and/or utilizing a 
data-sharing mechanism on a safe-harbor list in the appropriate context 
would exempt companies from additional privacy restrictions because 
the risk of harm to data subjects has likely been sufficiently mitigated. 
CONCLUSION 
The debate about the failure of anonymization illustrates what we will 
call the first law of privacy policy: there is no silver bullet. Neither 
technologists nor policymakers alone can protect us. But we have been 
missing the big picture. We should think of reidentification as a data 
release problem. Sound data release policy requires a careful equilibrium 
on multiple fronts: law and technology, data treatment and data controls, 
privacy and utility. 
It is important to keep data release policy and the surrounding debate 
from becoming parochial and separated from other parts of privacy and 
data security law. Hacking, surveillance, and inducement to breach 
confidentiality are all alternatives to reidentification attacks. 
Additionally, identification and sensitive attribute disclosure are just a 
few of many modern privacy problems, alongside occasionally related 
but technically separate issues like discrimination and manipulation. 
Yet if data release policy becomes too ambitious, it will become 
intractable and ineffective. The variables affecting the likelihood of 
reidentification and sensitive attribute disclosure are vexing enough. 
Thus, we have argued the locus of data release policy should be the 
process of mitigating these risks. 
Process-based data release protections are the best way to develop 
policy in the wake of the perceived and real failures of anonymization. 
                                                     
230. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, at 20.  
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Such an approach is driven by policies balancing protection with data 
utility. It is holistic and integrated. Perhaps most importantly, it is 
flexible and can evolve alongside the relevant science and the lessons of 
implementation. 
The vigorous and productive debate over how to protect the identity 
of data subjects has matured. Even though there are sharp disagreements, 
there is more consensus than at first appears. The next step is to develop 
policy from our lessons learned. Anonymization is dead. Long live the 
safe release of data. 
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APPENDIX  
Anonynmization and Risk: A Glossary of Terms 
 
Auxiliary information (background information; outside information): 
information outside of a data set. Auxiliary information can be used in 
an attempt to identify individuals in a data set. [Page 711.] 
 
Data use agreement (DUA): a contract that conditions access to, and 
use of, a data set on agreement to specific terms. A DUA may include 
such terms as refraining from reidentifying subjects in the data set, 
maintaining an audit trail, and perpetuating deidentification protections. 
[Page 739–40.] 
 
Deidentificaiton: the process by which data custodians remove the 
association between identifying data and the data subject. [Page 754.] 
 
Direct access: a form of statistical disclosure limitation (SDL) that 
encompasses both licensed data, which allows users who click-through 
the applicable licensing terms to perform any data query and receive full 
results, and authorized access to research data centers, which also allows 
any query but only returns vetted results. Direct access imposes the 
fewest restrictions on data but limits data access to qualified 
investigators who must agree to licensing terms or execute a DUA, 
which may also stipulate security measures and prohibit redistribution of 
the data sets or attempts to reidentify or contact data subjects. [Page 
717–18.] 
 
Direct identifier: data that directly identifies a unique individual, such 
as name or social security number. [Page 710.] 
 
Dissemination-based access: a form of SDL that refers to the practice 
of publicly releasing reduced, altered, or synthetic data (i.e., hypothetical 
data that have similar characteristics to the real data). A researcher using 
dissemination-based access can view full results to any query in a data 
set. The data custodian applies various techniques to construct the 
transformed data set before publicly releasing it. This form of access 
combines public release of data with masking of data sets by methods 
including generalization and suppression. Deidentification is a form of 
dissemination-based access. [Page 718.] 
 
K-Anonymity: a process that requires the data administrator to ensure 
that, given what the adversary already knows, the adversary does not 
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reduce the set of potential target records to fewer than k records in the 
released data. A weakness in this approach is that k-anonymity assumes 
that only a small number of attributes may be used as quasi-identifiers 
for purposes of a linkages attack. Several researchers have taken issue 
with this claim. [Pages 712–13.] 
 
Linkage attack: an attempt to reidentify individuals in a data set by 
linking the deidentified data set with additional information. The term 
“attack” is borrowed from computer security literature, hence the 
individual carrying out the attack is called an “adversary.” The 
additional information is called “outside,” “auxiliary,” or “background” 
information. [Page 711 & 734.] 
 
Open data: information that is accessible to everyone, machine 
readable, and offered online at zero cost, and has no limits on reuse and 
redistribution. [Page 719–20.] 
 
Personally identifiable information (PII): includes a range of 
information that can be used to identify an individual; some kinds of 
information can more readily identify an individual than others. Privacy 
laws focus on the collection, use, and disclosure of PII, and privacy 
harm depends in part on whether disclosed information is PII. However, 
as Schwartz and Solove have shown, there is no uniform definition of 
PII in United States privacy law. [Page 755–55.] 
 
Pseudonymization: a form of deidentification that uses a replacement 
value (like a pseudonym or number) for the identity of data subjects. 
[Pages 711, 753–54.] 
 
Quasi-identifier: data that does not itself identify a specific individual 
but can be aggregated and linked with information in other data sets to 
identify data subjects. Examples include birthday, ZIP code, and gender. 
[Page 711–12.] 
 
Query-based access: a form of SDL that allows users to interact with 
the data by posing queries, typically over a secure internet connection. 
There are several sub-categories of query-based access. (1) Remote 
analysis servers allow researchers to analyze confidential data without 
ever seeing the underlying data, although both the queries they can pose 
and the results they can obtain may be subject to limitations. 
(2) Differential privacy is a set of techniques whereby query results are 
altered, often by adding noise, so that released information does not 
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reveal any person’s data with certainty. In query-based access, data 
analysis uses statistical queries without direct access to underlying data 
sets. [Page 718–19.] 
 
Reidentification: the process of attempting to determine the identities 
of the data subjects whose identifiers have been removed from the data 
set. [Page 710–11.] 
 
Release and forget: a term used by Paul Ohm to describe when a data 
administrator releases deidentified records without restrictions or 
tracking what happens to the records after release. [Page 725.] 
 
Statistical disclosure limitation (SDL): comprises the principles and 
techniques that researchers have developed for disseminating official 
statistics and other data for research purposes while protecting the 
privacy and confidentiality of data subjects. Satkartar Kinney divides 
SDL into three major forms: direct access, dissemination-based access, 
and query-based access. [Page 717.] 
 
Unicity: a concept used to quantify how much outside information 
one would need, on average, to reidentify a specific and known user in a 
simply anonymized data set. The higher a data set’s unicity, the easier it 
is to reidentify data subjects in the anonymized data. Mobile phone 
metadata is highly unique and therefore can be reidentified using little 
outside information. The same is roughly true of credit card data. 
Unicity was coined by Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al. [Page 714.] 
 
